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PREFACE
Feminist scholars have just begun to develop a
comprehensive understanding of the state's relationship
to patriarchal power relations. My dissertation will con-
tribute to this understanding through original historical
research m women's labor history and through an informed
tneoretical assessment of this research.
Throughout this dissertation I will use the term
"patriarchy" to refer to a constellation of social rela-
tions in contemporary society whereby males are endowed
with economic, political, and social power and privilege
by the simple virtue of their gender. Neither historically
fixed nor universal, the specific content of gender-based
power relations must always be understood within a histori-
cally specific context. It is important to distinguish,
therefore, between an understanding of patriarchy as "father-
rule"--a social system characteristic of precapitalist
social formations in which a fami lially-based paternal
authority formed the model for economic and political
relations--and a more contemporary understanding of gender
relations within our liberal capitalist and racially strati-
fied society. But despite the historical transformations
patriarchy has undergone, the use of term remains important
IV
as an indication of the unfortunate historical continuities
embedded in gender relations: though taking different
forms, gender relations remain characterized at a fundamental
level oy inegalitarian power relations.
As a social relationship, patriarchy should not
be understood as trans-historical or biologically determined,
but as a social system which uses biological differences
as a basis for social inequalities. As a dynamic social
system, therefore, patriarchy does not automatically or
easily reproduce itself. Part of the purpose of this study
will be to assess the role the state has played in stabiliz-
ing and reproducing these relations.
Within the context of contemporary U.S. Capitalism,
patriarchy has come to be characterized by a sexual division
of labor whereby women are primarily associated with the
private sphere of the home and men with the public spheres
of work and formal politics. Women's primary identifica-
tion with private life, I will argue throughout the disser-
tation, is one important basis for her secondary economic
and political standing in the public world. The development
of this sexualized public/private distinction will be the
subject of my first chapter.
Chapter one will first address the development
of the distinction between the "privatized family" and
"public politics" in classical liberal theory. In brief,
v
I Will address the questions of how and why family life
came to be associated with private life, as well as how
the liberal definition of politics came to exclude familial
relations. This discussion will lead me to an assessment
of the role of the public/private distinction not only
in classical liberal theory but in contemporary liberal
feminist analyses which adopt this distinction. Through
this discussion I will draw important conclusions about
the limitations of a definition of politics which grows
out of this public/private distinction.
My second and third chapters will address the history
of state policy in regard to working women, with a focus
on labor policy in New York State during the Progressive
Era. First, I will document the existence of a heretofore
unknown sector of the labor force--homeworkers
,
or women
who were employed to produce or finish goods at home.
The exemption of these working mothers from all forms of
state regulation during this time period will stand in
contrast to the development of protective labor legislation
during the same time period for women working outside the
home in industrial occupations. Such legislation, I will
argue, limited women's options for work in the public market-
place while reasserting women's primary identification
with the private sphere of the home. The juxtaposition
of these two case studies will form the basis of my assess-
vi
inent of the role of the language of public and private
life in the formation of state policy. As much of the
legislation enacted during this time period in New York
served as a guidepost for long-standing federal legislation,
the implications of my study will reach beyond this specific
state and time period.
My concluding chapter will explicitly address the
problems associated with the development of a feminist
theory of the state. After reviewing the major liberal,
reformist, and marxist models of political power, I will
advance a perspective that can take into account the dynamic
process by which state policy is developed and assess the
role not only of organized political organizations but
of a dominant "ideology of motherhood" in the policy process.
In short, I will argue that the state has played a crucial
role in mediating the conflicts internal to a historically
dynamic patriarchal social system.
I wish to thank the Woodrow Wilson National Fellow-
ship Foundation Program in Women's Studies and the American
Association of University Women's Educational Foundation
Program for their generous support of my dissertation
research. I would also like to thank, for their help
and support, my committee members: Jean Elshtain, Joyce
Berkman, John Brigham, and my "unofficial" member, Kenneth
Dolbeare
.
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An array of people stuck with me through countless
editions of this dissertation. For their incisive criticisms
and dedicated patience, I would like to thank: Randy Pearl
Albelda
,
Sandy Blanchard, Louise Brown, Maryann Clawson,
Libba Moore, and Beata Panagopoulos
.
Finally, I d like to thank Bob Higgins for his
endless patience and wisdom; my mother, Margaret Daniels,
for teaching me both independence and stamina; and my
homeworking sister, Andrea Scott, who remains a constant
reminder of the contemporary importance of my historical
work
.
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ABSTRACT
WORKING MOTHERS AND THE STATE
(September 1983)
Cynthia R. Daniels, B.A.
,
University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain
Through original historical research in women's
labor history and an informed theoretical assessment of
this research, this dissertation addresses the question
of the ways in which state policy has reinforced women's
primary association with the private sphere of the home
and secondary standing in the public spheres of politics
and economics. The dissertation begins with an assessment
of the development of the public/private distinction in
classical liberal thought and addresses the question of
how the liberal definition of "public" politics came to
exclude "private" familial relations. Women's primary
identification with this private sphere, I argue, is one
important basis for her secondary standing in formal politics
and in the public marketplace. Chapters two and three
address the history of state policy in regard to working
women with a focus on labor policy in New York State
during the Progressive Era. First, I document the existence
ix
Of a heretofore unknown sector of the labor force-home-
workers, or women who were employed to produce or finish
goods at home. The exemption of these working mothers
from all forms of state regulation during this time period
is then contrasted to the development of protective labor
legislation during the same time period for women working
outside the home in industrial occupations. Such legis-
lation, I argue, limited women's options for work in the
public marketplace while reasserting women's primary identi-
fication with the private sphere of the home. As an out-
growth of my historical research, my concluding chapter
explicitly addresses the problems associated with the
development of a "feminist theory of the state." After
reviewing the major liberal, reformist, and marxist models
of political power, I advance a perspective that can take
into account the dynamic process by which state policy
is developed and assess the ways in which the state mediates
the conflicts internal to a historically dynamic patriarchal
social system.
x
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
iv
Chapter
I. PUBLIC POLITICS AND THE PRIVATIZED FAMILY 1
Introduction
1John Stuart Mill and the Classical
Liberal Paradigm
5Betty Friedan and Contemporary
Liberal Feminism 93
Conclusions
' 33
II. BETWEEN HOME AND FACTORY: HOMEWORKERS
OF NEW YORK, 1 900-1 91 4 42
Introduction 43
Major Characteristics of the Homework
System 4 g
Attempts to Regulate Homework 60
Social Reform Movements 60
Organized Labor 63
State Policy 68
Conclusions 75
III. NO PLACE FOR WOMEN: PROTECTIVE LABOR
LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN; NEW YORK, 1900-1925 ... 82
Introduction 82
Prohibitive Legislation 85
Regulatory Legislation 96
Night Work Laws 96
Hour Laws 102
Working Women Divided: "Equality v.
Protection" 114
Effects of Legislation 120
Conclusion: Motherhood and the State 127
xi
IV. CONCLUSION: DEVELOPING A FEMINIST THEORYOF THE STATE
...
1 37
The Growth of Welfare Liberalism
Theories of Political Power
Pluralism
Reformism
Marxist Perspectives
.!!!!!!!
Summary and Conclusions
....
1 38
1 45
1 45
1 48
1 57
1 66
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
201
CHAPTER I
PUBLIC POLITICS AND THE PRIVATIZED FAMILY
At a basic level, various liberal thinkers such
as Locke and John Stuart Mill have shared a view of family
life which stresses its private and non-political character.
Family relations have been viewed as naturally-based and
ideally empty of the individualistic and competitive power
relations that predominate in the public world of politics.
Liberal feminists have been forced to challenge this rather
strict distinction between public politics and the priva-
tized family as they have come to view family life as imbued
with patriarchal relations of dominance and subordination.
Recognition of the sexual division of labor in the home,
the importance of child-rearing practices, questions about
the control of women's reproductive capacities and sex-
uality, all of these have pushed feminists to a reestimation
of traditional definitions of politics--to one that can
explain these complex and crucial dimensions of gender
relations
.
But the question remains whether liberal feminists
can succeed in understanding the political underpinnings
of private relations while retaining their commitment
to liberalism. In order to answer this question it is
1
2necessary to understand the roots of the public/private
distinction in liberal theory and the definition of politics
that has grown out of it. One of the main questions I
will address in this chapter, therefore, will be: is the
depoliticized status of family life essential to liberal
theory and, if so, does it necessitate an implicit acceptance
of patriarchal power relations in the private sphere of
the family? The answers to these questions are crucial,
because insofar as the liberal tradition sees family life
in non-political terms, it is unable to address women's
dependent status within family life as one important foun-
dation of women's economic and political inequality. And
also, insofar as liberal theory renders these private famil-
ial relations invisible or immune from critical analysis,
it legitimates patriarchal relations in that sphere, helps
to deflect critical attention away from these relations,
and by doing so acts to perpetuate women's secondary politi-
cal, economic and social position.
This chapter will be divided into three sections.
First, I will explore the origins of the public/private
split in liberal theory. How and why did family life come
to be associated with private life? How did the liberal
definition of politics come to exclude familial relations?
Also, how is the public/private distinction connected,
in liberal theory, to views of human nature, epistemology,
and views of the state? In addition, I will address the
3question of whether the liberal version of the public/private
split inherently undervalues the relationships and charac-
teristics traditionally associated with women's work in
the private sphere. In other words, is there an inherent
-
alUatlve distinction between the public and private spheres
in liberal theory?
John Stuart Mill will provide the model for the
liberal paradigm in this first section. Mill, as a pro-
gressive liberal thinker, provides us with a good illustration
of both the strengths and limitations of liberal theory.
As a liberal thinker who rejected the strict Utilitarianism
of James Mill and Bentham, and who modified more pessimistic
Lockean views of human nature, he probably best represents
the spirit of Contemporary progressive liberalism. Finally,
this section will conclude with an assessment of Mill's
liberal feminism.
The second section of this chapter v/ill examine
feminist revisions of liberalism. I will focus here on
Betty Freidan s latest work, as she is one of the most
visible and influential contemporary liberal feminists.
Throughout this section I will address whether it is possible
to critically analyze the social foundations of family
life and understand the interconnections between women's
dependent status in both public and private life while
retaining a fundamental commitment to the liberal paradigm.
Insofar as such an understanding of family life is necessary
4to any; feminist analysis, this question will raise the
issue of whether a distinctly liberal feminism is viable
for an adequate analysis of women's position in contem-
porary society.
The third section of this chapter will address
the strategic implications of the liberal feminist analysis.
Liberal feminists, by uncritically accepting the liberal
dichotomy between the public and private realms and thus
the definition of politics that grows out of this distinc-
tion, have focused their attention on the legislative road
to equality. By doing so they have implicitly accepted
the conception of the state as "sex neutral" and have
limited their analysis of sexual inequality to those power
relations visible in the ’public’ world of politics. While
many liberal feminists are skeptical of state power, inso-
far as they are true to the classical liberal perspective,
many also continue to rely on state-sponsored solutions
to women's inequality. A clarification of this dilemma
is important for a more complete understanding of the role
the state has played in the maintenance of patriarchal
power relations, as well as for the question of whether
the state can or should be used as a vehicle for progressive
social change. This section will conclude with an assess-
ment of both the insights and limitations of the liberal
feminist understanding of state power and the strategies
for change that are an outgrowth of this understanding.
5Finally
,
I will raise some questions that can only
be answered through my historical research: What is the
relationship between women's identification with the private
sphere (specifically her primary identification as "mother")
and more public manifestations of women's inequality in
the marketplace and in her formal legal status? What role
has the state played in relation to patriarchal power
relations? And, what role has public/private ideology
played in the formation of state policy, particularly as
it effects women? Such questions will serve as guides
to the historical case studies which will follow this chapter.
John Stuart Mill and the Classical
Liberal Paradigm
Liberal philosophy, as articulated by Locke, and
reasserted by J. S. Mill, grew out of a reaction against
the absolute monarchy of late feudalism. Feudal relations
relied on the patriarchal family as the model for its inter-
woven economic, social, and political organization. These
relations were characterized by notions of duty, obligation,
obedience to paternal authority, and a hierarchy based
on birthright. In order to dismantle the existing system
of rewards and privileges based on feudal ties, liberals
sought to limit divine right by establishing a separate
political sphere where the legitimacy of the state was
grounded in the free consent of the governed. And, indi-
vidualism supplanted paternalism as the ruling paradigm
6for both economic and political life.
Two closely related fundamental commitments grew
out of the liberal critique of patriarchalism. First,
liberalism asserted a very specific notion of individualism
and invoked a view of this individual as independent and
rational. Liberal philosophy asserted an ’’abstract indi-
vidualism" which posited an inherent conflict of interest
between individuals and between individuals and society.
As aggressive and competitive by nature, we exist in conflict
with others in the pursuit of our distinct self-interests.
Each individual is rational, in the sense that each is
the oest judge of his or her self-interests and each is
capable of determining the best instrumental means to satisfy
those interests. In contrast to the feudal idea that we
have inherent and natural obligations to others in the
political order, the liberal atomized individual has no
a priori obligations to others in this liberal "state of
nature" save those that are explicitly contracted for.
As Richard Krouse has argued, the liberal rejection of
the patriarchal state rested on "a decisive lowering of
the ends and purposes of political society ." 1 The idea
of the state was transformed from an "ethical association
for the attainment of virtue" and based on obligations
imposed from above (from the will of God or the purposes
of nature) to an "instrumental association for the protection
of life, liberty, and property" and based only on the will
7ot free and equal Individuals. This "voluntaristic" view
of state power was based on the liberal definition of
individualism and required the strict limitation of state
authority
.
The second commitment that grew out of the liberal
critique of patr iarchalism involved a profound skepticism
of state power. Liberal individualism was marked by a
fundamental distrust of the collective power of the state
which required the establishment of strict limitations
to state interference in private affairs. In an important
way, the tension between the individual and society in
liberal thought became identified with the tension between
private individuals and the collective power of public
citizens. Individual freedom was based on one's freedom
from constraint or interference from both other individuals
and from the organized political power of the state.
Though our association with others in civil society is
necessary for the fulfillment of our needs and interests,
it also poses a threat to individual freedom. In other
words, the social bonds we form with others in the public
world are double-edged: while they enable us to further
our self-interest, they also potentially threaten indi-
vidual freedom and autonomy. The protection of individual
rights and freedoms from arbitrary state power necessitated
the establishment of an inviolable private sphere of life,
a sphere in which individual differences would be allowed
8to flourish and in which the individual would not be held
accountable to the judgements of others or the state.
As Mill states, "the individual is not accountable to society
for his actions insofar as these concern the interests
of no person but himself ." 2 For Mill the independence
of the individual from the authority of the states was
absolute.
"Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign ." 3 This redefinition of the nature
Of individuals led Mill to strictly limit the legitimate
purpose of state power. As he states, "the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others ." 4 The state can not intervene on the basis
Of what is "good " for the individual, what "it will be
better for him to do" or what will make him "happier."
Self-protection of the individual and the protection from
the interference of others replaced traditional moral con-
cerns as the raison d'etre of state power.
One of the most vexing problems Mill was to confront
would be defining the boundary between the individual and
society. In On Liberty he asserts, "To individuality should
belong that part of life in which it is chiefly the indi-
vidual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly
interests society. But what distinguishes that part
of life which concerns only the individual and "does not
affect the interests of others."? The liberal depoliti-
9cization of family life provided (for Mill and other early
liberals) one important part of the answer to this question.
The family, once the paradigmatic organizing principle
Of public life, retreated from public view into a newly
created, specifically private sphere. Not only was the
polity stripped of its familial basis; the family, by
necessity, was also "depoliticized.
" And this meant that
the development of a rather strict division between public
politics and the private family was one fundamental building
block of liberal thinking.
Wnile the break between private family relations
and public politics was essential to the liberal critique
or patriarchal ism
,
it would be misleading to assert that
family life was rendered completely immune from liberal
discourse. While marriage, for instance, would come to
oe conceptualized within the terms of a "free" liberal
contract, familial relations remained, for most liberal
philosophers, characterized by traditional hierarchical
relations. In addition, most liberal thinkers, such as
Rousseau, Hegel, and Locke, recognized the important polit-
ical functions family relations should perform, most notably
in the "proper" education of children. But while the
privatized family might serve certain political ends
,
it
remained, in and. of_ itself
, immune from the voluntarist
critique of hierarchical and authoritarian power relations.
In sum, the liberal definition of human nature,
Which was founded in an antagonistic division between the
individual and society, required a strict differentiation
between public and private life in order to demarcate the
limits to state power. While the drawing of this boundary
has always been problematic and controversial in liberal
theory and practice, the division between family life and
politics has consistently informed the definition of this
boundary. The threshold of the home provided one important
limit to the authority of state power and was one basis
from which liberals argued against the arbitrary use of
state power. Liberal feminists, including Mill, have run
up against this theoretical commitment in their attempts
to view family relations in political terms. For not only
was the family protected from governmental interference;
it was also excluded from the language of a critical polit-
ical analysis. As such, family life virtually "disappeared
from the public political vocabulary.
With the exception of Mill' s later works, the family
relations of the traditional patriarchal family were viewed
by classical liberals as both natural and necessary. As
such they were rendered immune from the liberal critique
ol au t.hor i tar ian power in political life. Also, many
liberal thinkers, such as Locke, viewed the family as a
relatively autonomous unit which provided the essential
moral and educational training for good citizenship, but
which remained immune from the liberal egalitarian language
Of public politics. Specifically, the interest of women
"disappeared" as they were assumed to converge with the
interest of the father/husband. As Susan Okin states,
"Whereas the liberal tradition appears to be talking about
individuals, as components of political systems, it is
in tact talking about male-headed families ." 6 Conflicts
internal to family life were to be resolved not according
to the voluntary and contractual rules of the liberal polity
but according to the traditional and obligatory laws of
nature. This is precisely the point that Mill disputed
in his treatise on women's subordination—and a point that
contemporary liberal feminists must still contend with.
For the moment, I will reserve critical judgement on this
point and move on to another aspect of the liberal public/
private split that holds important implications for a fem-
inist analysis
— its association with the reason/emotion
dichotomy
.
One characteristic of the public/private split
that is crucial for an understanding of a feminist analysis
is its association in liberal thought with the division
between reason and emotion. This section will elaborate
the liberal characterization of public reason and private
passion and discuss the ways in which the reason/emotion
split helps to define the issues and concerns we see as
appropriate for public debate.
As stated previously, the liberal redefinition
of the state required the assertion that individuals have
the capacity for rationality. The authority of the state,
no longer based on arbitrary power and a natural hierarchical
order, required the consent of free and rational individuals.
Reason, therefore, was to replace obligation or force as
the foundation of political legitimacy.
The liberal view of human nature is based not only
on a division between the individual and society, but on
an alleged division, internal to us all, of reason and
emotion. As Jean B. Elshtain states, liberal epistemology
divides us into public minds and private desires: "The
public realm and "public mind" exist as defenses against
the private sphere in which desire, conceived as uncontrolled
and arbitrary, is held to rank supreme.
Private life, as the repository of our baser instincts,
is characterized as the site of emotions, morals, and values.
Our non-rational urges, our passions in life--both good
and bad--are seated and flourish inside that private sphere.
The private realm of feeling, sentiment and morality is
not and should not be subject to the same laws of reason
as public relations are, because private morality is based
ftot in reason, but in non— rational individual "preference."
Our private desires, therefore, are not mediated by "law"
or the rules of instrumental rationality, but by subjective
teachings about what is 'right' and 'wrong'.
While relations in the private sphere are theoreti-
cally characterized by relations of affection, mutuality
and dependence, and a sensitivity to the needs of others,
relations in the public sphere of politics are characterized
as abstract and instrumental. To bring the instrumental
language and logic of public relations to bear on personal
relations would be first to tyrannize individual freedom
(by legitimating government interference in private life)
and second to apply standards of behavior inappropriate
to private activity.
This view of public and private life supported
a sentimentalized vision of the family and a view of public
politics as stripped of morality. In fact, this de-moral-
ization of public politics was necessary to the ideal of
the liberal state as a neutral arbitor of individual inter-
ests. Only by containing our private passions so, and
restricting the entrance of moral considerations into public
politics can we create the preconditions for the establish-
ment of a sphere of politics in which all can be said to
be treated equally. Ideally, we enter politics as abstract
individuals and are treated "blindly" under the law. As
R. P. Wolff characterizes it, human differences and inequi-
ties of the private world should not "enter into the contrac-
tual arrangements of the public world. When they do, as
they frequently do, liberal theory tells us that an injustice
has been worked which it is the function of the laws to
correct
.
The association of reason with the public
sphere, or more specifically with public politics, is the
foundation on which the claim can be made that the law is
neutral, that the state balances all interests equally.
It is not the purpose of the state to determine what is
"good" for people or what is "just", or to establish "just-
goals for the social order. The state merely establishes
a battleground where each individual, or groups of indi-
viduals, can meet and negotiate settlements between conflict-
ing interests and ends. Politics has to do with the estab-
lishment of fair and proper means (procedural democracy)
and not with the just or unjust ends of politics (substantive
democracy )
.
The distinction between public reason and private
passion is important to understand, for as we shall see
in the next section, it forms an important foundation for
dill s liberal feminism and continues to inform the thinking
of contemporary liberal feminists. In some sense, Mill
"reelevated" our conception of public life, not by reintro-
ducing moral or ethical concerns into his view of politics,
but by painting public life as the only realm in which
individuals develop their capacity for rationality as well
a_s their sociality. Independence and self-development
were not developed by a hermetic retreat into the private
sphere (as the logic of the argument so far might lead
one to believe), but by the active engagement in the battle
for rights and interests in the public world of politics
Public discourse and debate, freedom of both thought and
speech as unquestionable rights, and freedom of action
us a qualified right, allow for the intellectual debate
and stimulation necessary for the development of rationality
and the cultivation of our sociality. But that socialty-
the participation of individuals in the civil world for
the protection of rights and interests-is a veneer, in
a sense, over our more deeply rooted essential individualism
irrational 1 cy . The calculating intelligence fostered
by our participation in the public world of politics serves
to check and redirect toward more constructive purposes
our more irrational, emotional natures. Sociality and
rationality must be cultivated,, from this point of view,
and are not viewed as "first nature."
Mill could make this argument only because of his
evaluative association of the private world withour baser
non-rational instincts, and the public realm with our
capacity for rationality. In private life, to which women
were confined, our actions and beliefs tend to reflect
our most narrow and immediate interests, desires, and fears,
and our judgements tend to be unref lective
. In public
life, on the other hand, we are forced to take opposing
points of view into account and therefore to subject our
beliefs to question; we develop our capacity to transcend
our immediate self-interests as we recognize the long-term
common social interests of all. m this process we exercise
and develop a self
-ref lective capacity for calculation
and intelligence-
-in short, we become reasonable.
Elshtain characterizes the split between reason
and emotion and its concurrent identification with the
private and public spheres when she states that "the split
in Lockean epistemology between reason as formal rationality
and passion as scarcely contained desire, and the notions
of human personality erected upon it, require a public-
private split of a particular kind, one that allows human
beings to exist in two divergent sphere." 9 The problem
for feminists, including Mill, was that while men partici-
pated in both spheres, women were ostensibly relegated
to one. As such women were subject to a theoretical catch
22 in classical liberal theory: they were denied the capacity
for reason at the same time they were denied access to
the means (according to the liberal viewpoint) by v/hich
instrumental rationality is developed--that is, participation
in the public world. As Zillah Eisenstein states,^ 9
In liberal patriarchal ideology, woman has no
political lire. Her life in the home is her
life. Whereas the family is differentiated
rrom political life for men, these spheres are
still equated for women.
. . . In the end she is
excluded from political life. Men are freed
from familial patriarch rule; women are rele-
gated to it.
While in important ways women have always played an important
role in public life, primarily through community and reli-
gious organizations, it was precisely the formal exclusion
of women from public politics that Mill f irst protested,
and which formed the foundation for his liberal feminism.
Mill's characterization of the private sphere as
the seat of non-rational emotions is explicit in his feminist
argument. He states that women's "social position allows
them no scope for any feeling beyond the family except
personal likings and dislikes, and it is assumed that they
would be governed entirely by these in their judgements
and feelings in political matters ." 11 For Mill, the only
way to correct this tendency to look upon all political
questions as "personal questions" is to grant women the
suffrage. Only through their participation in the public
v/orld can women transcend the narrow view of life that
their confinement to private life has engendered.
Mill s characterization of private life is revealing.
Women's minds, he argues, are occupied by the management
of "small but multitudinous details ." 12 "The general bent
of their talents is towards the practical ." 13 "a woman",
he argues, "seldom runs wild after an abstraction" because
"her more lively interest (is) in the present feelings
of persons which makes her consider first of all... in what
manner persons v/ill be affected" by government policies. 1 ^
While these characteristics are an asset inside
family life, they are a hindrance to women from this ration-
alist liberal perspective. Given this "bent," women may
be unable to transcend their "sympathies and antipathies"
in the grave affairs of politics
.
15
In On The Subjection
of Women Mill argues that women's development of "sentiment"
at the expense of "understanding" has led them to see only
the "immediate effects on person, and not (the) remote
effects on classes of persons" of state policy. This,
he argues, blinds women to "the ultimate evil tendency
of any form of charity or philanthropy which commends itself
to their sympathetic feelings ." 16 Women's uncritical
support for charity for the poor is in fact a product of
"unenlightened and shortsighted benevolence" which "saps
the very foundations of the self-respect, self-help, and
self-control which are the essential conditions both of
individual prosperity and of social virtue ." 17 Mill implic-
itly expresses an evaluative distinction between public
and private life when he argues that "unless women are
raised to the level of men, men will be lowered to theirs ." 18
Women, he argued, lacked a sense of public-spiritedness
and failed to develop intellectual aspirations because
they were primarily concerned with the "immediate and
material needs of the family ." 19
My point here is not to deny that there is an element
of truth in Mill's arguments or to underrate the importance
of his arguments in challenging classical liberal assump-
tions about women's nature. Indeed, Mill's arguments were
powerful in leading his contemporaries to question naturalist
assumptions about women's "nature," for he argued that
these characteristics were the product not of nature but
of women’s circumstance. What I do wish to demonstrate
here is that Mill's analysis was limited in important ways
by his acceptance of a particular public/private split.
Human relations can only be viewed as political
relations if they are raised from the level of "natural"
to the level of "social" relations, that is, if they are
seen as voluntary rather than necessary. This is precisely
the transformation that allowed for the liberal critique
of the "natural" power relations embodied in the paternal-
istic state. But this thinking did not extend to private
family relations in classical liberal thought, in part
because of the liberal need to exempt private life from
public power, but also because relations in private life
were viewed as qualitatively different than public relation;
As Susan Okin states
,
20
intrafamilial relationships--no matter how much
power or authority they involve— are perceived
as being outside the sphere of the political....(Liberals) have perceived human relationships
within families as totally and qualitatively dif-
ferent from relationships between actors in the
political realm.
.
.
Though Mill recognized relations of dominance and
suoordination in family life he never fully transcended
the split between public politics and the private family,
between public reason and private passion. For instance,
the liberal equation of reason with instrumental rationality
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led Mill to either systematically undervalue or ignore
the skills, or what one might call alternative forms of
reason and understanding, that women develop in familial
relationships. A keen sensitivity to the often unspoken
needs of others, a judicious ability to mediate interper
sonal conflicts in the interests of long-term family sta
bility, the life-long patience and forethought required
by parenting, the ability to negotiate the short-term
immediate desires of children with the long-term effects
Of childrearing practices, all of these belie a form of
rationality that blurs the boundary between reason and
emotion. 1 They embody a form of reason that has not yet
been stripped of moral concerns, and as such they fall
outside of liberal definitions of rationality. Mill's
characterization of the private sphere, above, clearly
demonstrates his acceptance of this dichotomy.
i4y argument here is not to deny the ill-effects
of life-long confinement to the domestic sphere, but to
point to the ways in which this particular conceptualization
of public and private life denigrates or misunderstands
characteristics traditionally associated with private life
and, by extension, women as guardians of that sphere.
Given Mill's point of view it seems ironic that
he argues in the end that women can achieve equality while
retaining their primary identification as mothers. In
the end, Mill failed to advocate women's actual integration
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into the public world «of either politics or work,. lnstead
he maintains that 22
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While he recognizes women's right and capacity to partici-
pate in public life he falls short of offering the means
by which she can actually do so. For Mill, the opportunity
to participate in the public world is sufficient : 23
It does not follow that a woman should actuallysupport herself because she should be caoable ofdoing so: in the natural course of events shewin not.
This failure on Mill's part, I think, is not simply a failure
of nerve, as Richard Krouse has suggested
.
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Rather I
think it is an outgrowth of some fundamental liberal assump-
tions. While Mill brings the critical language of politics
to bear on family relations he still maintains, implicitly,
as acceptance of family relations as rooted in nature and
as operating according to a qualitatively different standard
of behavior than public relations. Though he is critical
of the language of "nature" throughout his feminist analysis,
in the end it is the only language that can make sense
of his argument that women remain the guardians of children
and home. As Susan Okin argues
,
25
By the time he wrote The Subj ection of Women,
Mill clearly (recognized) the invalidity and
fraudulence of identifying the natural with the
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This identification of private relations as natural
in some sense is evident also in Mill's explanation of
why men dominate women. As Elshtain argues, "he speaks
of an original 'law of force' and 'law of superior strength'
as the basis of human society and the relations between
the sexes." She continues, "Mill's explanation of what
motivates man to dominate women in the first place is the
sheer desire of males for power over females--a monocausal
theory of human thought and action ."^ 0
Even as Mill recognized inequalities inside family
relations, he still maintained that these relations were
qualitatively different than those in the public world,
for they were based on passionate and selfish instincts
rather than on calculated and rational self-interests.
While relations based on the rule of force or natural status
had been rooted out of public politics they remained the
basis of relations in the private sphere. Relations of
dominance and subordination in family life were, for Mill,
nonrational, for they were still based in a rather primordal
instinct and not reason. It is because of this epistem-
ological undercurrent that associates private life with
non-rational emotionalism that Mill falls short, in the
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end, of fully coming to grips with the interconnections
between more visible 'public' social structures and 'private'
family relations. Such an understanding would have led
Mill to a perspective that more fully developed the con-
nections and interrelations between women's primary iden-
tification as mother in the home and her status in the
marketplace and in formal political rights.
B
_
etty Friedan and Contemporary Liberal Feminism
From John Stuart Mill to contemporary liberal
feminists the liberal paradigm has stood in sharp contrast
to the systematic exclusion of women from formal political
rights. Liberal feminists, beginning with Mill, were quick
to point out the contradiction between liberal principles
of individualism and equal treatment, and the sex-class
exclusion of women from participation in public politics.
Once women were 'granted' the capacity for reason, just
like men, their exclusion from full citizenship could not
be upheld without a fundamental violation of the principles
upon which liberalism was built. These were, and still
are, the grounds upon which liberal feminists base their
fight.
The question I will address in this section will
be whether or not women can be "absorbed" into the liberal
paradigm without a fundamental alteration of liberal pre-
mises. Is the inclusion of women into the liberal concep-
tion of puolic politics a sufficient answer to women's
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inequality in society? In order to address these questions
it is first necessary to understand the distinctly liberal
underpinnings of liberal feminism. I will focus here on
the latest work of Betty Friedan’s, as the most recent
and self-conscious statement of liberal feminism, after
a brief review of the liberal feminist framework.
Liberal feminists adopt the basic assumptions and
principles of liberalism and seek to extend those principles
to women. Underlying liberalism is the antithesis between
the individual and society, and a related division between
the public and private spheres of life. According to this
point of view, "society", both in its laws and its collective
opinion has unfairly relegated women to the private sphere,
has defined women politically by her maternal functions,
and has therefore restricted her participation in repre-
sentative government, education, and a public life of debate
and discourse. As Stanton argued, women have been defined
not as individuals, but in relation to others:^
It is only the incidental relations of life,
such as mother, wife, sister, daughter, which
may involve some special duties and training.
In the usual discussion in regard to women's
sphere... her rights and duties as an individual,
as a citizen, as a woman (are uniformly subor-
dinated) to the necessities of these incidental
relations, some of which a large class of women
may never assume.
When feminists such as Mill and nineteenth century
suf rragists launched their first attacks on women's inequal-
ity they did so primarily within the established terms
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of the debate. Given that
excluded from the liberal
was certainly a necessary
inists challenged a strict
women has been systematically
individualist revolution this
first step. Though some fern-
division between public and
private life through attempts to bring the moral concerns
of private life to bear on the public world of politics
(a point I Will discuss in chapter 4), most simply called
for the removal of barriers to women's full participation
in the public realm of politics. Women, suffragists demanded,
should simply be allowed to enter the outside world in
full stride with men and be accorded the same rights as
any other free individual in liberal society. As Stanton,
again, forcefully argues in her "Solitude of Self", 28
The isolation of every human soul and the
necessity of self-dependence must give each indi-
vidual the right to choose his own surroundings.he strongest reason for giving women all the
opportunities for higher education, for the fulldevelopment of her faculties, her forces of mind
and body; for giving her the most enlarged freedom
of thought and action; a complete emancipationfrom all forms of bondage, of custom, dependence,
superstition; from all the crippling influences
of fear; is the solitude and personal responsi-bility for her own individual life. The strongest
reason why we ask for woman a voice in the govern-
ment under which she lives... is because of herbirthright to self-sovereignty...
While these concerns were not exclusive of all
feminists, they represent the primary characteristics of
of a dominant liberal discourse which continues to inform
feminist politics. Classical liberal concerns are clearly
evident in contemporary liberal feminism, where the fight
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for suffrage has been superceded by the fight for the equal
rights amendment
. Feminist calls for abortion rights based
only on a principle of possessive individualism reflect
Mill s concern with the "sovereignty of the individual"
over mind and body. "Contract" marriages reflect the class-
ical liberal conception of conceptually distinct individuals
who have no inherent obligations to each other or to the
social order save those which are explicitly agreed upon.
The call to government to negotiate and enforce discrim-
ination suits reflects the conception of the state as the
neutral arbitor of individual rights and liberties. Calls
for women's economic and personal independence are reminis-
cent of the suffragist s insistence on freedom of oppor-
tunity, freedom of choice and freedom for women to develop
their natural capacities through education unfettered by
artificial social conventions which judge them to be inferior
to men by simple virtue of their sex.
From the liberal perspective, the achievement of
individuality and a self
-development for men and women
requires an essential freedom from social constraint, pro-
tection of individual rights and the maintenance of an
inviolable private sphere. In short, liberal principles
should be sex-blind.
Contemporary liberal feminists define the goals
of the movement in the same terms as their historical
sisters. As Betty Friedan characterizes the women's movement
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of the 70 's:
-In the first stage, our aim „as full partici-
pation, power and vorce in the mainstream, inside the party,
the political process, the professions, the business world,
women were not to challenge the terms of the debate, but
1,29
be included in them: "The first stage of the women's
movement did not involve a new mode of thought. Once we
broke through the feminine mystique and said that women
were people, we merely applied the abstract values of all
previous liberal movements
... and (demanded) an equal share
of its rewards as previously wielded and enjoyed by men." 30
Fnedan echoes the concerns of Stanton that women
be treated as individuals rather than by their "incidental"
relations to others when she demands that women be allowed
"to find their own identity as separate from men, marriage,
and childrearing" so that they could "take their own place,
as individuals in society." 31
Once recognized as free liberal individuals women
could "demand equal opportunity with men, power of their
own in corporate office, Senate chamber, spaceship, ball-
field, battlefield..." and fight "for our equal opportunity
to participate in the larger work and decisions of society
and the equality in the family that such participation
entails and requires." 32
While the forceful language of individual rights
to self-sovereignty has always provided the fuel for liberal
feminist analyses, the liberal framework has also limited
28
feminist analysis in important ways. An internal tension
in liberal feminist analysis became evident when feminists
turned their attention to the family. Liberal feminists,
from Mill to the present, tested the limits of liberal
analysis when they turned an eye to the politics of the
family and personal life. The importance of family rela-
tions to women's subordination has been acknowledged through-
out the development of feminist thought. For instance,
Mill damns oppressive family relations throughout The
Subjection of Women and argues that "the superstructure
of free government cannot be based upon a legal basis of
despotism on one side and subjection on the other" in the
family
.
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And in a letter to Susan B. Anthony, Stanton
wrote, "I feel this whole question of women's rights turns
on the point of the marriage relation, and sooner or later
it will be the topic of discussion ." 34 Friedan's Feminine
Mystique
,
perhaps the most catalytic work of the early
70
' s, targeted family relations as the primary trap that
kept women from pursuing their independent self-identities
in the public world. But recognizing the unequal nature
of family relations and developing an adequate analysis
and prescription for change are two different matters.
Once liberal feminists recognized family relations
as political, that is, as important in the establishment
and maintenance of patriarchal power relations, they were
compelled to develop a strategy that could eradicate this
fundamental aspect of women's oppression, within the
liberal framework, their most logical strategic option
was to hope that changes in women's legal status-such
as equitable divorce laws and affirmative action legisla-
tion-would have the power to transform repressive familial
relations. But recognition of the politics of the family
without a concurrent redefinition of politics and political
strategies for change have led liberal feminists down a
difficult path.
From the early 70'
s
on feminists of all varieties
looked to the private dimensions of women’s inequality
in psychological studies, sex role socialization liter-
ature, consciousness-raising groups. Indeed, a new sexual
politics developed that spoke to the core of feminine
identity and to Fnedan’s "feminine mystique". How was
this sexual politics reconciled with the classical liberal
view of the family as depoliticized?
In some important ways it hasn't been reconciled
and this disjuncture has led many feminists to cast aside
the liberal framework. For others this dilemma led to
the extension of liberal values of contract relations and
individualism into family life in what some have called
the rationalization of family life. The resolution of
this internal tension in liberal feminism--between the
need to view family relations as an important part of
women s oppression and the liberal commitment to a view
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of the family as ideally depoliticized-will hold important
implications for liberal feminism in both theory and prac-
tice
.
The difficulty of comprehending a sexual politics
Of the family through the liberal lens is recognized, however
dimly, by triedan in her newest manifesto for the women's
movement, The Second Stage. Friedan is frustrated by the
movement's concentration on what she calls "sexual politics"
for she feels that sexual issues are diversionary and battles
over them fruitless. In drawing her critique she illus-
trates well her acceptance of the liberal division between
public and private life and a liberal definition of politics—
and also shows the limitations these commitments impose
on a feminist analysis.
Friedan posits a sharp distinction between "private"
sexual politics and the real battle for women's equality.
The women's movement, she argues, must avoid "getting locked
into obsolete power games and irrelevant sexual battles
that can never be won..." 35 She goes on to argue that
even in the 70 's, 36
many of us saw the extremist rhetoric or sexual
P°litics as a pseudo-radical cop-out from the
real and difficult political and economic battlefor women in society—which would provide a
new basis for equality in the family.... We never
thought this revolution could be won in the bed-
room. The sexual politics was an acting-out of
rage that didn't really change anything. When
women's position in society changed, sex would
take care of itself.
31
How does Friedan define sexual politics? She goes on: 37
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It is clear what Friedan views as the "real" battle-
ground for women's equality. She defines it always in
opposition to sexual politics: 38
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school, get the union toligh fo parenting leave, or lobby the state
-gislature to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment.
Friedan can posit such a sharp distinction between public
and private politics, and elevate the former at the expense
of the latter, only because of her complete acceptance
of the liberal definition of politics and power. Real
power is found only in the public sphere and is acquired
through formal legal rights. Women's climb up the economic
ladder is dependent on winning this real political power
and enacting laws to protect equal opportunity.
Because she sees formal legal rights as the key
to equal opportunity Friedan has a hard time deciding whether
or not we've won "the first stage." She often writes as
if we have, while paying lip service to battles not yet
won, like the E.R.A. For instance, she fears that young
women will take our feminist victories for granted and
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risk losing the™ by not taking threats from the New Right
seriously enough. it is interesting to note that she never
warns these young women that they may face discrimination
or simple job market segregation that laws, as yet, have
not been able to touch.
Friedan's denigration of sexual politics is indica-
tive of the liberal inability to understand the intercon-
nections between private power relations and public power
relations. Indeed, we get the sense that the private
battles that women fought in the "bedroom" were more "games"
than struggles for real power and control over our lives.
If Friedan is an easy target it is only because
she states explicitly what is implicit in most liberal
arguments: real politics and power is equated with formal
legal rights and formal government. Even as she recognizes
the inequities involved in family relations, they remain,
m the end, outside of the sphere of politics, and as such
fade into the background when strategies for change are
considered. For Friedan, or more correctly from the liberal
perspective, there truly is nothing to be won "in the bedroom"
simply because power is located, by definition, in the
public world. As Zillah Eisenstein writes,
^
The definition of politics as government activity
makes it impossible for (Friedan) to view the
structural relations of women's lives--the family,
the sexual division of labor, sex-class oppression--
as part of the political life of a society The
liberal equation between publ i c power and po 1 i t ic
s
excludes the family from political analysis ...( and
)
excludes daily life activity from political analysis.
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Friedan argues that in the second stage „e must change
the terms of the debate and focus on "the larger economic
and political situation which affects both women and men,
and which women now as persons can actively affect ." 40
She calls for a redefinition of the relationship between
home and work life" so that we may achieve true "personhood
in society." No longer should women or men be forced to
choose between family and career or be expected to excel
at both in "superwoman" fashion. In this sense she moves
beyond Mill by questioning women's primary identification
as mother. For Friedan, we have already swung too far
in the opposite direction: women have sacrificed the family
for careers and are now suffering for it.
The problem with Friedan' s argument is that she
wants to change the terms of the debate without challenging
the foundation upon which it is built. She wants to trans-
form our thinking about the private home and the public
work without altering the conditions that created this
division and then reified it as natural.
Rather than analyzing the foundations of this split
in the structural needs of both patriarchy as well as
capitalism, she tends to view the problem of women's oppres-
sion as an ideological problem, or in other words, as a
problem of simply changing values and our ideas about home
and work. The first stage involved a "quantum jump in
consciousness." In the second stage, from Friedan'
s
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point of view, the solution is not so difficult:
"stripped
of polarizing rhetoric, the practical problems of restruc-
turing home and work may not be as difficult as they now
seem." 42
The problem with Friedan's analysis is two-fold.
First, while she wants to recognize the afamilial and
sexual aspects of women's oppression-in issues such as
abortion, rape, pornography, sexual preference, and violence
against women- she always regards these issues as secondary.
The reason for this, 1 believe, is that she defines politics
and power in traditional liberal terms. These issues simply
fall through her strict categorization of "real" politics
and are viewed by her as secondary or derivative of hier-
archical relations in formal legal rights and in the economy.
The second problem with Friedan's analysis is that,
because she adopts a rather strict distinction between
public and private life, she misunderstands the connections
between women's formal political and economic inequality
and women’s privatized position of dependence in the family.
On the relationship between these two sites of inequality
Friedan herself is unclear. At times she implies that
formal equality can be achieved without a fundamental trans-
formation of private family relations. At others she implies
that these private relations will "take care of themselves"
after women have won full political and economic equality
with men. This lack of clarity is rooted in her failure
to draw important connections between pubUc and private
relations of inequality. For instance, lf ^
^ thS 3 °b market 13 baSSd °n ^ assumption that women
wrll be unpaid primary child-rearers then a full and equal
integration of women into the labor force will never be
possible until a fundamental transformation of family
relations takes place.
But rather than engage in a "chicken and egg" debat
with Fnedan, my more important point is that she will
be unable to understand the dynamic relationship between
public and private elements of women's oppression while
She holds to a public/private distinction that views rela-
tions in the private sphere as fundamentally non-political
AS
—familial relationships, no
'
matter how much power or authority they involve, are still
viewed as falling outside the sphere of the political
.
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Friedan's analysis is fettered not by her own failures
but by the liberal definition of public and private life
which pushes her, in the end, towards a view of women's
position in the family as severed from the "real" politics
of the public world.
Conclusions
Liberal theory's strict categorization of public
politics and the private family masks certain realities
about the nature of human beings in general, and the nature
Of male/female power relations in particular.
First
, the liberal emphasis on individualism and
the simultaneous identification of the private sphere as
3 " haVen " a9alnst Which power should not be exer-
cised blinds us to the fundamental sociality of all human
beings. Only as long as the individual is conceived of
as "conceptually distinct" from or "logically prior to"
society, could liberals continue to talk about limiting
social interference into private life, or protecting the
individual from the intrusions of society and other human
beings. If „e come to view human beings as social beings
by nature then we can no longer maintain such a sharp
distinction. If the formation of our very identities as
individuals is based on and infused with social relations
then it makes little sense to talk about protecting the
individual from the interference of others, for we are,
from the start, "interfered with." As Jean Elshtain state:
"it is only in a private sphere of highly charged intimate
relationships persisting over time that the possibilities
for understanding are the greatest and the greatest under-
standing is possible ." 44
By conceptually burying these social relations
in the less visible private world of the family we serve
to mask or mystify our fundamental sociality. Indeed,
our capacity to participate in a public world of politics,
to negotiate and reason with others is based in and created
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by the relations of Mutual reception and intersub, active
understanding" that „e establish first in family U fe.«
The liberal emphasis on individualism has also
mystified the ways in which public social relations affect
us even m our most private moments. Feminists have moved
towards a greater understanding of this point as they have
explored the depths of women's subordinate in the psycho-
logical development of men and women. As we come to under-
stand how inequities in women's legal and economic status
inform our most intimate relations we are pushed toward
a view that can understand the dynamic relation between
public and private life, and between the development of
individual identity and autonomy and our collective identi-
ties. We can draw the connection between individual lives
and the impediments of our social history.
In addition, the public/private split devalues
those human characteristics that are most closely associated
v/ith women's nature" and the nature of family relations.
Relations of mutual dependence and nurturance, of a non-
instrumental sensitivity to the needs of others, are rel-
egated to private life and viewed as somehow less important
than the worldly concerns of the public sphere (as if the
reproduction of the species was not a "worldly concern"!).
In other words, liberalism elevates the competitive indi-
vidualism that is the hallmark of public activity in a
liberal capitalist society as it denies the social relations
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Of the Private world that are the bas . s £or that
ualism. It is exactly these hinds of pr i vate concerns-
m°rallty
' to the needs of others, non-instru-
mental relations of mutuality fhat- ni t at have ostensibly been
out of liberal, and Often feminist, politics.
Finally, the liberal public/private split holds
important strategic implications for liberal feminists
because it imp l les a rather narrow view Qf poUtiog ^
political strategies. The liberal feminist focus on legal
rights as the hallmark of political freedom and equality
meant that once liberal feminists recognized the political
nature of family relations, their strategies for change
were inadequate. Recognition of a politics of the family
Without a simultaneous redefinition of political strategies
for change have led liberal feminists down a conflict-
ridden path.
AS Jo Freeman states, in her implicit recognition
limits to legalistic solutions to women's oppression
,
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n°t find the going so easy.
The idea that women's primary responsibility for child-
rearing and traditional sex roles could be transformed
through the establishment of "legal precedent" displays
a distinct unself-consciousness about the resistance liberal
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thought would pose to state
"interference" into private
life (in the service of women's equality, no less) and
a naivete about the neutrality of the liberal state.
In important ways we need to expand our definition
Of politics in order to be able to comprehend and critically
analyze some of the most important and personal aspects
of women's inequality. By expanding our definition of
politics I am not suggesting that we simply enlarge our
idea of what areas of life should legitimately be regulated
by the state. Such a proposal is the target, rightfully,
of advocates of the New Right, who often claim that the
inevitable extension of liberal feminist politics would
be the direct government regulation of family affairs (the
establishment of a Department of the Family??).
The problem is that there is a kernel of truth
to the New Right accusations. If we simply remain within
the liberal definition of politics then we may well end
up with extension of government power into areas of life
traditionally reserved for women. By failing to challenge
the liberal definition of politics—with its emphasis on
legalistic solutions to social problems—and by failing
to question the sex neutrality of the state liberal feminists
have ended up advocating mechanistic solutions to women's
inequality. By dismissing too easily the heart-felt fears
of women active in the New Right--fears of state control
of intimate relations— liberal feminists have failed to
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learn a healthy skepticism of state power
a highly organized bureaucratic state.
especially of
Very often the solutions put forth by liberal
feminists simply extend the instrumental rationality of
the public world into the home. This should hardly repre-
sent feminism's vision of the future. Friedan recognizes
the threat to personal freedom that mechanistic strategies
for change pose and here I think she is worth quoting at
length for both her insights and her limitations : 47
The founding fathers of this republic were notwrong when they wrote into the Bill of Rights
for K? °f certain basic areas o? privacy
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Though Friedan 's concerns are legitimate, the very serious
problem here is that she throws the baby out with the bath
water because she lacks the conceptual tools to do otherwise.
If feminists fail to address seemingly private issues such
as sexuality and reproductive freedom (in all its variations)
then we will end up with purely symbolic victories.
It is important to note that improvements in women's
legal status have come hand in hand with increases in vio-
lence against women in their homes and on the streets,
With continued destructive objectification of women's
sexuality in the media, with what now seems like a triple-
day of work for most working mothers, and with the psycho-
logical damage engendered by women's conflict-ridden Posit
between traditional sex role requirements and the new
corporate image of the "free" woman. Changes in the legal
status of women and strategies aimed at state-sponsored
solution to women's oppression will at best be inadequate
and will at worst lend itself to cooptation and/or the
potential for repressive state policies that further in-
stitutionalize women's inequality. There is a lesson to
be gleaned from liberal theory and it is one that feminist
of all varieties have not taken seriously enough: the
repressive potential or organized state power should make
any progressive movement skeptical of state-sponsored
solutions for change. My point here is not to argue that
the state represents only the interests of rich white males
or that the state is incapable of supporting progressive
social policies for women, but to argue that liberal femin-
ists in particular have all too often uncritically accepted
a view of the state as "sex neutral."
vVhat is needed is not just a rethinking of liberal
assumptions about human nature, the nature of politics
or the state, but a comprehensive historical study of the
relationship of the state to women's oppression.
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The case studies that follow this chapter will
be the beginnings of such a study. My case study Qf^
workers will be important, for instance, because it points
to the tension between the classical liberal commitment
to non-interference in the private realm of family relations
and feminist analyses that have come to view relations
inside that private sphere as one foundation of women's
oppression. On the other hand my study of protective
legislation will question whether the liberal state has
m fact kept to the cultural commitment to the public/private
split. Both studies will, I believe, provide an opportunity
to view the relationship between liberal theory and practice,
and to understand the state's interest, if indeed it has
an interest, in regulating familial relationships and women's
labor both inside and outside of the home. The "thread"
that will guide my research will be the question of what
place the language of public and private life has played
in state policy and what effect this has had on women's
subordinate position in society. Only after such research
IS complete will I be able to assess the role the state
has historically played in regard to patriarchal power
relations
.
CHAPTER II
BETWEEN HOME AND FACTORY: HOMEWORKERS
OF NEW YORK, 1900-1914
While contemporary analysts are busy documenting
women's recent entrance into the workforce, scholars of
women's labor history are busy proving that we have always
been there. Labor historians have traditionally under-
played— or simply neglected-the role of women in the paid
labor force. Recent revisions of women's labor history
have gone far to right this neglect, but still have some
distance to go. One important area, for instance, that
remains relatively unexplored is the employment of married
women. I believe that this is partially due to the fact
that an important source of employment for married women--
homework-
-remains "hidden from history."
Homework-
- the industrial employment of women at
home to produce or finish goods for a manufacturer or con-
tractor—was one of the main forms of employment for married
women at the turn of the twentieth century. Recent evidence
has indicated that it still may be a significant source
of income for married women. Yet contemporary homeworkers
,
like their historical sisters, remain virtually invisible.
If we are to construct an accurate history of women's
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participation in the labor force (or for that matter, an
accurate account of women's lives in general) then we must
explore in depth the employment of women as homeworkers.
m addition, because these industrial workers cross
the line between the home and the factory, they can provide
us with a unique look at the interaction of family and
work life and provide new insights into recent debates
about the relationship of patriarchy to industrial capital-
ism.
Introduction
According to the thirteenth U.S. Census there were
over one and a half million immigrants living in New York
City in 1910. Roughly 770,000 of this immigrant population
were women. Yet only 280,000 of these women were recorded
by the census as being gainfully employed" in 1910.^
Labor historians have always assumed that the remaining
women—nearly half a rnillion--survived on the incomes of
their fathers or husbands and were not a formal part of
the paid labor force. My research has led me to believe
otherwise. Rather, many of these women earned a wage through
the homework system and formed an integral part of the
labor force. The purpose of this chapter will be to doc-
ument the existence of this large yet unacknowledged sector
of the labor force; to trace its development in key indus-
tries in New York City; to examine the relationship of
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homeworkers to organized iabor, social reform movements
and state policy of the time; and to understand the impli-
cations of my research for women's labor history.
Between 1907 and 1909, nearly 600,000 southern
Italian immigrants settled in New York City's manufacturing
district below 14th Street. 2 Many manufacturers employed
this immigrant population to produce or finish goods outside
the factory. This kind of employment was known as "homework."
^ involved the industrial employment of married women
and their children in their tenement homes. The homework
was handed out at the factory, taken home and worked on,
and returned to the factory the following day where it
was paid for by the piece. This work primarily involved
the sewing of garments, making of artificial flowers and
feathers, sorting and cleaning of coffee beans and nuts,
the making of human hair wigs, hat-making, cigar-rolling,
and lace and embroidery work. But in all, over one hundred
different items were produced (under contract from a manu-
facturer) by these women and children in their tenement
homes
.
2
Because the historical data on homeworkers is at
best partial, I have had to approach my research from a
number of different angles in order to gain a clear picture
of how many women were engaged in this type of work, the
conditions under which they labored, and the reasons why
they chose this type of work. While City, State, and Federal
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reports contain statistics on women gainfully employed
outside the home, no category existed for recording data
on piecework done in the "sanctity" of the home. Many
of the sources I have used only incidentally provide infor-
mation on homeworkers. For instance, following the Triangle
fire, studies made by the State of New York into factory
health and safety conditions contain sections on tenements
occupied by homeworkers. Because it was feared that tubercu-
osis and other infectious diseases were being spread to
the wealthier classes through contact with artificial
flowers, fancy nuts, coffees, garments, and other articles
worked on in the tenements, the Consumer Protection League
investigated the health of some of the home manufacturers
of these goods. The National Child Labor Committee, in
their campaign for protective child labor legislation,
documented widespread employment of children as homeworkers.
Labor unions, such as the Cigarmakers, Capmakers, and
Garment workers, saw homework as cheapening the standard
of labor for organized factory workers and therefore engaged
in their own investigations of homework. Authors specif-
ically interested in working women of the time, such as
Mary VanKleek and Edith Abbott, make mention of homeworkers
in their larger studies of the condition of working women.
Collectively, these sources provide rich evidence of the
predominance of homework during this time period.
My research has led me to believe that over 250,000
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immigrant women were employed as homeworkers
City in 1911. My estimate was established as
in New York
follows
:
in 1911 there were 13,268 tenement buildings licensed by
the city for homework. 4 Each of these tenements contained
a (conservative) average of ten families. It is safe to
assume that at least one woman in each licensed dwelling
(or tenement apartment) was engaged in homework. All
investigative reports on homework for this time period
indicate that only about half of the tenements visited
by investigators were licensed. I have attempted to correct
for the number of unlicensed tenements by doubling the
official number. My very conservative estimate is that
26,536 tenement buildings contained homeworkers with approx-
imately ten families occupying each tenement. This gives
me a rough total of 265,360 women engaged in homework in
New York City alone in 1 91 1 . it should be noted here that
this figure does not include the children who often worked
with their mothers.
In addition, the licensing system (which will be
explained later) seriously underestimated the number of
homeworkers because the lav/ did not cover all forms of
homework. While only forty-one articles were covered by
the licensing system, investigators found that over one
hundred items were worked on by homeworkers in New York
City. For instance, embroidery and lace work--one of the
largest employers of homeworkers—did not require licensing.
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While there exists no irrefutable empirical data
on homeworkers for this period, there are a number of ways
of verifying my figures. Elizabeth Watson, in a 1912 in-
vestigation in New York City, documented the existence
of 51
,
500 homeworkers in the embroidery trade alone and
estimated that the number might be twice that if all manu-
facturers of embroidery had been registered with the city.
She estimates, also, that the total number of homeworkers
would be at least 125,000 in New York. 6 m a related
report, Felix Adler, then chairman of the National Child
Labor Committee, stated, "in the embroidery trade alone
there are 61,000 out-workers. Sixty-one thousand in one
trade. In the crochet trade one manufacturer gives work
outside of this factory to 2,000, another to 600, and so
on, so that Miss Watson estimates that it would be conser
vative to say that there are 125,000 out-workers in the
city.
"
7
Wmle exact figures may evade us, my research makes
a number of important trends immediately clear. First,
homeworkers constituted a very large and important part
of the labor force during this period. Perhaps no other
major sector of the labor force has gone so unnoticed by
labor historians. I will explore the reasons for this
negligence in depth later. For now, it need only be noted
that, whatever the exact figure, homework was a primary
source of employment for married women and formed the
foundation of many major industries
this time.
in New York City at
Second, my figures challenge fundamental myths
about the employment of women and in particular, the employ
mSnt ° f marrled Italian «»en during this time period.
My figure doubles the commonly accepted number of working
immigrant women in New York City in 1910 and increases
by 50% the total number of working women. As Louise
Odencrantz pointed out in 1919, contrary to popular belief,
Italian women ranked second as contributors to the family’
budget among all immigrant nationalities in 1910. 8 And
married Italian women were employed more often than Poles
or Russian Jewish wives and were just as likely to be em-
ployed (outside the home) as German or Irish wives, in
1911 at least one-third of all Italian wives in New York
City were employed outside the home. 9 These figures, taken
together with my figures on the employment of women as
homeworkers-
-which were not included in the above calcu-
lations— paint a picture of the work life of the Italian
woman quite different from popular belief.
As noted above, most homeworkers were married
immigrant women. Most were also between the ages of 25
and 45 and had young children to care for. 10 In addition,
almost all of these women had husbands who lived at home.
Many of these men, entering the city around the turn of
the century, could find work only as day-labourers on city
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construction sites, railroads, streets, or sewers. The
tremendous influx of imm igrants lnto the clty before ^
created a labor market where competition was heavy and
work was scarce. Work for a day-labourer was sporadic,
and no work due to bad weather, lay-offs, injuries, or
illness all meant no pay. As the husband of one homeworker
stated in 1913, "when the weather is not too cold, or the
sun too hot, or the rain too wet, then there is work." 11
While these men could earn a subsistence wage when employed,
often they were unemployed for at least one-third of the
year. In general, this meant that the family could not
survive by the father's work alone. As a consequence,
their wives and children found employment as homeworkers
in order to ensure that the family could survive throughout
the year.
Major Characteristi c s of the Homework System
By far, the largest number of homeworkers were
found in the men's ready-made clothing industry. The garment
industry itself employed one-fourth of all industrial workers
in New York City in 1905. 12 And this industry was one
of the largest employers of women in New York. 13 While
the machine operating work, and the basting and pressing
of garments was done in the factory, the more labor-intensive
process or hand-finishing was done by homeworkers.
Garment finishers primarily worked on men's coats
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and pants. Coat finishing involved turning under and
stitching the lining to the cloth of the garment at the
armholes, bottom, and neck, and sewing on the undercollar.
Usually the finisher had to pull out the basting threads.
This simple part of the work was often performed by the
younger children of homeworkers. The price rate for fin-
ishing coats varied from two and a half to twenty-five
cents per coat. 14 The finisher of pants had to line the
pants at the waist, stitch the lining at the top, tack
it at the pocket, fell the pocket to the seam, turn up
and baste the bottoms, and since they had no zippers, she
had to sew on the buckles and the buttons. The average
pay rate for pants was five cents a pair. The homeworker,
therefore, could make an average of 23 cents per suit,
Which would then sell at retail for $20 to $25. An entire
family could rarely earn more than 70 cents a day at garment
finishing.
While the garment industry in New York was dominated
by Jewish and Italian workers in the factory, Italian women
monopolized the finishing of garments at home. One U.S.
Senate investigation of the time reported that 98% of all
finishing of garments was done by Italian homeworkers and
their children. A New York State report confirms that
the Hebrew and. the Italian" are predominant in the garment
trade. "The Italian woman working in her tenement has
absorbed ninety-five percent of the so-called home finishing
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in New York Ci ty . . .
.
Finishing amounts tQ^
Of the work on a garment but owing to the low wages paid
in this class of work the price is about- „„h -Lf-e o ut one-seventh of
the price for the entire garment. The Italian home finisher
works for about two-thirds of the price which other nation-
alities formerly received for the same work and, where
formerly ten to fourteen cents was paid for finishing,
the Italian does the same work for five to seven cents." 17
In the garment industry, therefore, we find both
an ethnic and sexual division of labor. As one investigator
stated, despite the prevailing tendency "for the employees
to be recruited from the same race as the foreman," in
the clothing industry Jewish foremen tended to hire Italian
women exclusively for homework. As the report states,
no matter how great the poverty, the Hebrew men seldom
allow the women of their family to do the (clothing) work
at home, even though they may have been shop workers before
marriage." 18 Prior to 1900, apparently, Jewish women did
predominate in garment homework, but after that time, with
the lowering of wages and the immigration of large numbers
of Italians, Italian women predominated. For instance,
in one canvass of almost 500 homeworkers made in 1908,
no Russian Jews were found. 1 9
Because of the seasonal nature of the industry,
garment finishers worked an average of 220 days a year.
These women had to make the most of the busy season, and
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took as many garments as they could secure and worked
limited hours during
work. As the Report
1911 states
,
20
the seven months when they could
on Women and Child ^earners
un-
find
of
ihus to say that a certain per cent of
women worked eight hours pe? dav i Lkper day, means that some Sme bliween the ?imeof rising and going to bed thev out -in in'hours sewing on garments. In more than n^n manYout of ten the work is interrupted by the prepar- S
H» r
eight hours a day' on the work For the home-worker who has these duties, part of the work isgenerally perrormed after the point of fatiguehas been reached... J-arig
As this quote illustrates, the homeworker was subject to
the most extreme form of the "double day." One can only
imagine what a day was like for the many women who put
in fourteen to sixteen hours a day at homework.
As in all forms of homework, wages differed dra-
matically between those working at home and those in the
factory. On the average, women in the garment industry
earned $6.00 a week, while homeworkers could earn only
$3.60. It should be noted that this figure represented
the work of more than one labourer, for many children worked
with their mothers at home. 21 The justification for paying
homeworkers 60% of what factory workers earned will be
discussed later.
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Clearly homeworkers could not survive only on this
meager income—and most did not. More than 88% of home-
workers in the garment industry had husbands who were
present in the home. As noted earlier, these men were
unemployed for one-third of the year. But when employed
rhey could earn between ten and twelve dollars a week.
While homeworkers were also unemployed for one-third of
tne year, due to the seasonal nature of the industries
they worked for, the combined income of the husband and
wife kept most families from starvation. Although the
wages of homeworkers were small, it would be misleading
to think of their income as simply "supplementary" to their
band s income. Rather, wages from homework provided
a basis for subsistence that was necessary for the material
survival of the family. Moreover, the presence of these
women at home played an important role in maintaining the
psychological and cultural stability of the family.
Another large group of immigrants, 98% of them
Italians, found work making artificial flowers for hat
manufacturers who used the flowers to decorate ladies'
hats and Easter bonnets. The starching, dyeing, cutting,
and the final process of branching (or designing) the
artificial flowers was done in the factory. Over 75% of
all the artificial flowers made in the U.S. in 1910 were
produced in New York City; at least half of these were
22produced by flower homeworkers. The flower maker first
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pulled the pre-cut patterns of rose vioW, olet, or poppy petals
apart. This was the simplist part of the wort and often
Children as young as four years old oould help with this
wort. The petals were then slipped up the stem and oinehed
lnt° Place abOUt the "***>" or bud which forned the center
Of the flower, and sometimes leaves were also pasted on
the stem.
One investigator found the Rapallo family at work
on artificial flowers in their two room apartment. Their
rate of work and pay represent the average for a flower-
making family. The Rapallo's made 18,000 violets in a
week for which they were paid $4.50. Mrs. Rapallo was
30 years old, had seven children, and was from southern
Italy. As she said to the investigator, "We get 15 cents
a bunch for this kind of flowers and we can make five bunches
a day (1440 flowers) if they (her children) all work.
But 75 cents a day's not much, with rent $11.00 a month,
and seven children who always want to eat." Her husband,
she said, "had no work for two years." 23
As another homeworker said, "We all must work if
we want to earn anything." 24 The rate of work and the
flexibility" of the wages paid in this industry are well
illustrated by the following quote from one experienced
homeworker in the flower trade: 23
You can't count home work by the day, for a day
is really two days sometimes, because people
oiten work half the night. When the boss asks me
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how many flowers I can make in a dav I Tcannot tell, but I know how many I can do •
heard
U
the
SOI"e .9irls are so foolish?*"^*,
°
m praising themselves and belli™ inboss that they did the work in a day ^he ^ashamed to say they worked half the tnn®u tney only hurt themselves, for the hocsk that ™uch iA * izvn:
On the average, flower makers could earn between sixty
cents and one dollar a day-for a woman working with the
help of at least three children. 26
Like that of so much other homework, the demand
for artificial flowers was seasonal. From April to October
there was no work. In the busy season, a family with more
than three workers could earn $4.90 a week, which was
approximately 60% of what a factory worker doing exactly
the same work could earn. 27
Invariably, children did homework with their mothers,
primarily because the low rate of pay required many busy
hands. In almost every form of homework boys worked with
their mothers until they were eleven or twelve; then they
would get jobs as errand or newspaper boys on the street.
Girls, on the other hand, continued doing homework until
they could find work in a factory, usually when they turned
sixteen or seventeen. Many of these older daughters, once
employed outside the home, would help with the homework
when they got home or would bring additional homework with
them when they returned at night. In this way, employers
could avoid prosecution for working girls overtime in the
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factory, for work done in the home was exempt from labor
regulations. This form of overtime work occurred in any
trade adapted in any of its processes to homework.
Milliners also used feathers, as well as flowers,
to decorate ladies' hats. The sweeping artificial ostrich
feathers (up to four feet long), which were the fashion
around 1910, were made in tenements located in the Italian
districts of the Upper East Side. The season for feathers
was from March to June, and from September to December.
The feather maker was employed at "willowing" which consisted
Of tying to every flue or filmy strand of a good ostrich
feather two strands stripped from inferior ostrich feathers. 28
In 1907, when the trade started in New York City, few knew
how to willow and fifteen cents was paid per inch of knots.
The following season, as more workers learned the trade
and as Italians began to dominate the industry, the price
went down to 13 cents an inch. It successively dropped
to 11 cents, 9 cents, 7 cents, 5 cents, and in 1910, to
3 cents an inch. One plume bringing 3 cents an inch con-
tained 8,613 knots. 29 The feather sold at retail anywhere
from $8.50 to $25.00. One homeworker reported that she
had to work one and a half to two days in order to earn
72 cents for one finished plume.
^
In one newspaper, during a two week period in 1911,
there were 205 advertisements for women to take work home--
almost fifteen ads per day. Contrary to what one might
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expect, finishers of clothing were never advertised for,
and flower makers were rarely advertised for. According
to Elizabeth Watson, who made this survey, "The absence
of advertisements for workers in the predominating tenement
trades indicates, significantly enough, that these trades
are well established in the homes, the source of supply
for such work is well known to the workers and the applicants
f°r W°rk are more than ec3ual to the demand for workers." 31
A pattern begins to emerge as to the life/work
cycle of these immigrant women. As a young child, one
would be expected to contribute to the family income through
homework. As a 16-20 year old woman, one could look forward
to employment in a factory. And, as one approached marital
age, the chances of remaining in the factory dropped dra-
matically. As The Report on Women and Child Wage-Earners
indicated, "Between 18 and 22 the changes in the force are
so rapid that less than half of the number of females em-
ployed at the age of 18 are found employed at 22
. T^e
findings of this five-city survey of the garment trade
are significant, for they corroborate surveys which indicate
that most homeworkers were between 25 and 45 years old.
Presumably at marriage, these women would drop
out oi public view as wage-earners and continue to earn
a wage as homeworkers. This also indicates that the peak
wage-earning power of most women was concentrated in the
few short years from age 16 to 20. Once married, the new-
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found social status of these women as mothers served to
drive down their earning power as homeworkers.
m addition, the low pay-rate for homework, coupled
with the wife's new-found responsibilities for care of
the family, could not have provided the same sense of
"independence" women in the factory might experience by
earning a wage. As one author states. 33
unlike many of her sisters of other races the
that^ec
WOman by going to work does not achieve
to be the°rtief
n
1
e
?
endenCe Whl °h iS °ften thought
to take no ^ ? h e lmPellin9 the modern womanup a gainful occupation in this wav fhp
simul tane
^ ^ ^ Para<J°*ical position o/
'
ous wage-earning and dependence.
Homeworkers-
-as the name itself implies-were literally
caught between the home and the factory— fulfilling both
the needs of the traditional family for a "proper" mother
and the demands of industrial capitalism for cheap and
"flexible" labor.
The high turn-over rate indicated by the above
figures certainly worked to the advantage of manufacturers—
in employing women both in the factory and at home. As
one manufacturer frankly admitted, "I want no experienced
girls (to work in my shop), they know the pay to get... but
these greenhorns ... they cannot speak English and they don't
know where to go and they just come from the old country
and I let them work hard, like the devil, for less wages." 34
Older women in the factories might demand fairer wages;
older women at home could not. Scattered throughout the
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tenements of New York, hired on a day to day basis, and
caught between the need to earn a living and demands of
Childcare, these women had little option but to accept
whatever wage was offered. As Rheta Childe Dorr stated
in homework "exists because the manufacturer finds
it economical to spread his finishing processes through
thousands of kitchens.
.. .They get their work done for
P actically nothing. That is why homework exists.
While paying homeworkers an average of 6* an hour,
manufacturers could also save the expense of renting,
heating and lighting a workplace. The expense of direct
supervision of workers was easily replaced by the discipline
enforced by circumstance. Competition for homework was
enough to insure high rates of return for manufacturers.
In addition, factory owners could subvert almost every
form of labor protection through the use of homeworkers.
When shop workers went on strike, homeworkers could be
employed to make up the slack. While labor regulations
prohibited the employment of children under 14 and the
overtime work of women, homework could be given out at
unregulated rates. During the busy season, homeworkers
could be employed by the thousand, only to be dismissed
at the slightest downturn in trade. The insecurity fos-
tered by irregular work compelled the homeworker to produce
at a rate Lhat often exceeded human endurance, during the
busy season.
ijt tempts to Regul ate Homework—bocial Reform Movements
The evils" of the homework system were well-docu-
mented by social reformers of the time. It is telling
the main concerns expressed in every investigation
made daring this time period. Without exception, two main
concerns infused the study of homework: the concern over
labor and the rear of spreading infectious disease.
Both concerns, while worthy in and of themselves, demon-
strate an essential lack of sensitivity to the condition
Of homeworkers themselves, and a level of analysis that
failed to reach the true causes of these conditions.
Homeworkers lived in the crowded tenement districts
located near the factories and workshops on which they
depended for a livelihood. In 1894, New York's East Side
included thirty-two acres on which 32,000 people lived—
a density of one thousand people per acre. Even Prague,
known for the worst ghettos in Europe, had only 485 people
per acre at its worst. 36 The usual living apartment in
the New York tenement had two or three small rooms; in
these lived families with as many as eight or nine children
It is estimated that 95% of the immigrant families lived
with more than three people in a room, while six in one
room was not uncommon. There were at least 100,000 tenemen
rooms in New York City with no window, even onto an air
shai.L or an adjoining room; only one in four had any direct
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sunlight; the rest had windows which opened onto an alley
or stagnant air shaft. 33
Maintaining good health in these cramped, dark,
and unsanitary living quarters was difficult at best.
Infectious diseases spread easily under these conditions,
and ordinary childhood diseases often brought death.
Italian children had a death rate almost five times that
of the entire city as a whole from measles, and the highest
mortality rate from scarlet fever and whooping cough. 38
Overall, the death rate of children under five years of
age in double decker tenements ran up as high as 204 per
thousand. 39
Tuberculosis reached almost epidemic proportions
under these circumstances. It has been estimated that
homeworkers living in the Italian district of New York
City were fourteen times more likely to die from tubercu-
losis as people living in the upper income neighborhoods
across from Central Park. 40
In addition to garment finishing, flower and feather
making and lace, and embroidery work, homeworkers also
orten earned a wage picking through coffee beans and shel-
ling and cleaning nuts for fancy restaurants in Manhattan.
Members of the Consumer's League of New York were particu-
larly appalled, and rightfully so, to find homeworkers
with infectious diseases cracking nuts with their teeth.
Accounts of infectious homeworkers using the coats sent
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home for finishing as bed covering at night abound in eye-
witness accounts reported by horrified investigators.
Time and again, scrupulously detailed reports of "disease-
ridden" homeworkers are attested to in State and City reports
The following excerpt is typical: "One home finisher had
a little boy suffering from whooping cough, when he had
a coughing spell the mother thrust her finger down his
throat in an effort to relieve him... the mother wiped her
fingers, covered with mucus, on the pants on which she
was at work." 41
While social reformers documented the unhealthy
conditions under which homeworkers lived, they did so most
often from the point oi view of the consumer. Rarely did
reports recognize the hazards to homeworkers themselves
rrom working on infected garments or foods. What one finds
instead is concern over the unsanitary nature of the "work
room" where the goods were produced, without any recognition
or the fact that these same places were the homes of workers.
When these reports are not expressing concern for the
infection of the consumer, they are bemoaning the degraded
state of the child homeworker.
The Child Labor Committee of New York often joined
with the Consumer's League in attempts to eliminate homework.
These organizations characterized the Italian homeworker
m particular as the worst offenders of child labor laws.
One 1912 article entitled "The Child Who Toils At Home"
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leveled sweeping criticism at hcmeworkers who benefited
from the work of their children: 42
Mas-:;, s
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By attacking the symptom rather than the cause
Of these conditions, social reformers often threatened
the economic survival of these families. They failed to
see that children were employed because their families
could not survive on such low wages without them. Further-
more, the point of view expressed by many of these accounts
demonstrates an ethnocentrism common among social workers
of the time. American social workers accustomed to the
"modern" conception of childhood could hold no sympathy
for those who believed that children were responsible for
contributing to the economic survival of the family under
anY circumstance. Such an idea was common among rural
southern Italian immigrants, and was reinforced by neces-
sity once these immigrants had settled in New YOrk 43
Attempts to Regulate Homework
—
Organized Labor
At the turn of the century, a growing number of
factory workers were organizing themselves into unions.
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union members saw homeworkers as cheapening labor, or worse,
as scabs. When factory workers struck for higher wages
and oetter conditions, manufacturers could simply continue
production through the use of homeworkers. The difficulty
Of organizing homeworkers is indicated by the strike of
cigar homeworkers in 1877. Samuel Gompers notes in his
memoirs the disastrous failure of this strike. Not only
aid the striking workers lose their jobs. They also lost
their homes, for the manufacturers who employed them also
owned the buildings in which they lived and quickly evicted
over one thousand families, replacing them with new immi-
grants who would work for even lower wages. 4 4
Beginning in 1 874, the Cigaririakers International
Union waged a public campaign decrying the evils of home-
made cigars, stressing the unsanitary quality of cigars
rolled in "TB-ridden" tenements, and condemning the wide-
spread use of child labor in homework. 45 This campaign
resulted m the passage of the first piece of legislation
prohibiting homework in 1884. But the law was quickly
cnallenged by cigar manufacturers in the courts and within
four months ruled unconstitutional in the Jacobs Decision
of the New York State Court of Appeals. 45 The act would
have prohibited the manufacture of tobacco products in
tenement houses in cities with a population of 500,000
or more on the basis that such production was a threat
to public health. The court decision ruled that "the health
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of the tenement population is not Jeopardized by the manu-
facture of cigars in those houses"” and therefore declared
that the act exceeded the police powers of the state of
New York. The legislation and the court decision were
significant, for they marked the beginning of a fifty year
period in which no legislation would be judicially upheld
that directly prohibited homework £er se. instead, legis-
lation would be limited to issues of public health, and
homework laws took the form of sanitary and health regula-
tions
.
Finding the courts unsympathetic to their cause,
the Cigarmakers turned to direct economic action as a way
of eliminating homework in the cigar industry. They contin-
ued their public campaign against the "infectious" cigars
and instituted the first union label campaign to distinguish
home-made from factor-made cigars. Playing on the fear
or tuberculosis, the cigar-makers greatly reduced the number
of cigar homeworkers. In addition, the union also made
the abolition of homework a demand in their strikes and
boycotts. As evidenced by state and city reports, by 1912
almost all cigar-making was strictly confined to formal
manufacturing.
The United Garment Workers of America soon joined
the fight against homework. Like the cigar workers, their
first line of attack was to institute the union label and
to incorporate the abolition of homework into strike demands.
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While legislation had been effectively employed to reduce
the number of sweatshops in New York, this legislation
did not formally apply to homeworkers. Anti-sweatshop
legislation made sharp distinctions between the workshops
located in tenements and the living quarters of homeworkers.
The latter were subject only to sanitary and health regu-
lations
.
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The garment workers were not as successful as the
Cigarmakers in their campaign to eliminate homework. The
specialized division of labor in the garment trade-which
broke the production of a garment into almost 150 different
operations-
-made the industry particularly suited to the
emloyment of home finishers. As noted earlier, homeworkers
m this industry performed only a fraction of the labor
on each garment. This made it exceedingly difficult to
distinguish between shop-made and home-made garments, unlike
the production of cigars. Often, clothing produced in
a union shop could be sent out to homeworkers for final
finishing and then sent back to the shop to be labeled
"union made." One investigator who found homeworkers
working on pants reported that "the pants bore the label
of a prominent Broadway firm. Each pair had, in addition,
a white cotton label sewed in, bearing the name of the
clothing union. The introduction of machinery into
the clothing trade served to increase, rather than decrease,
the number of home finishers a manufacturer might employ.
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With increased production in the shooPr factory owners required
from two to four homeworkers to finish the work of one
machine operator The very nature of the production
process itself-that is, the increase in production rates
with the introduction of machinery and the very specialized
division of labor in this industry—worked against the garment
workers in their attempts to eliminate homework.
Abolition of homework in a particular industry
generally reflected the level of organization and militancy
Of its unionized workers. The only effective way of limit-
ing homework was through direct economic action. The first
union to successfully demand the elimination of homework
was the United Cloth Hat and Capmakers Union. After a
thirteen-week strike in the Winter of 1904-1905 in New
York City, the union won an agreement with the owners to
eliminate all trade with sweatshops and homeworkers. The
International Ladies Garment Workers, after a 1910 strike
in New York City, were able to win elimination of homework
in the women’s clothing industry. This provision was then
incorporated into every subsequent strike settlement.
For this reason, I found little evidence of homework in
the women's clothing trade. By contrast, in the men's
ready-made clothing industry, where unionization wasn't
achieved until 1914 (with the establishment of the Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers), homework continued to flourish
openly. Save for restrictions imposed by these few strongly
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unionized industries, homework
unregulated. 51
remained alive and largely
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Under pressure from social reformers and organized
abor, New York State established the homework licensing
system in 1892. The New York Tenement House Homework Law,
which set up this licensing system, was concerned primarily
with health and sanitary conditions and required that any
tenement in which homework was carried on be licensed by
the state. Tenements would be inspected to ensure that
they met the standards set by the sanitary code and building
law. Any building that housed tenants with infectious
or contagious diseases could not be issued a license.
As noted earlier, the licensing system covered only forty-
one of the more than one hundred items worked on by horne-
5 3workers. The licensing system, because it applied to
buildings rather than to individual homeworkers, or even
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individual apartments
, often worked to the detriment of
individual homeworking families. !f a homeworker contracted
a contagious disease, landlords could simply evict them
and maintain their good standing with the state. And,
like most welfare state regulations, the licensing system
itself was almost completely ineffective anyway, because
SO few inspectors were assigned the enforcement duties
of watching over the 1 3,000 licensed New York City tenements.
With the National Child Labor Committee in the
lead, social reform organizations attempted to at least
restrict homework by having child labor laws and restrictions
on women's work extended to include homeworkers. In terms
of child labor, two primary tactics were employed. First,
compulsory education laws often came into conflict with
the need of homeworkers to employ their children during
school hours. The Education Laws of New York required
the attendance of children at school between the ages of
six and fourteen. All investigative reports documented
the high truancy rates of school-age children of homeworkers.
But these laws were nearly impossible to enforce. Also,
compulsory education laws could do nothing about the employ-
ment of children at home under the age of six or over four-
teen
.
A second tactic was to apply child labor laws to
work done at home. In New York, children under the age
of sixteen were prohibited from working "in connection
p.m.
With any factory" before 8:00 a.m. and after 5:00
^ addlti°n
' theY C°Uld not ployed for more than eight
hours a day, six days a week. 55 Ironically, parents who
complied With the compulsory education laws were often
forced by necessity to violate labor laws by having their
Children work before 8 o’clock and after 5 o’clock, in
order to make up for piecework "lost" during school hours.
During the busy season, homeworking families often worked
up to sixteen hours a day--children included.
Similarly, with the approval of the 54-hour work
week for women in 1912, women could not be employed for
more than nine hours a day, or before 6:00 a.m. or after
9:00 p.m., six days a week. 56
There were two basic difficulties in attempting
to use laws restricting the work of children and women
to eliminate homework. First, reformers were required
to prove that children were actually employed by their
parents. Since parents never paid a real wage to children,
they could not be said to be formally employed. Pay in
the form of remuneration--clothing, shelter, and food--
could not be considered as evidence of wage labour.
The second and more profound difficulty lay in
trying to conceptualize the home as a factory. The key
to using such legislation was to convince legislators and
the courts that the home constituted a "factory" under
the law. Here the liberal ideological distinction between
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the public and private spheres held fast. Time and again
the efforts of social reformers and labor organizers would
be thwarted by the ideological difficulty of this distinction
As one New York state report stated, "A home in which man-
ufacturing is carried on is not a factory. The 54-hour
law, therefore, does not apply to work done in the home." 57
The conceptual difficulty of this issue is witnessed
in the following exchange between members of the New York
State Commission investigating homework and the Chief Counsel
to the Commission as they attempt to reconcile the contra-
diction between liberal ideology and the reality of homework:
Chairman (Robert F.
Q. Do you think now
obstacle against
a child under 12
in working in a
Wagner )
:
' Commissioner, that there is a legalyour interfering in any way withfrom helping the mother or father
tenement house?
A. We have no authority under the existing law.
Commissioner Phillips: You cannot say that the childis working for hire.
The Chairman: Why not? The mother gets the pay
child contributes toward the labor.
but the
The Witness (John Williams): In whose hire is the child?
By Mr. Elkus: Q. What difference does that make? We will
say he is in the hire of the manufacturer. I say in
other words suppose the manufacturer said, "I will
employ you and your child, and I will pay you fivedollars a week for your work, including your child's
work that would make the child an employee, would
it not?
A. Of the manufacturer?
Q. That would be a Factory?...
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workshop, or other manufacturingor ousiness establishment. J
Commissioner Phillips: Business establishment must bethe predominating idea of the thing.
Mr. Elkus: No, it is not. (and so on ) 58
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This exchange unwittingly provides us with a unique
loot at liberal ideology in action. Little did Mr. E ikus
hnow that in his attempt to violate the distinction between
home and factory he was destined to lose his battle by
half a century of well-entrenched liberal thinking. Despite
the powerful evidence before them, it is not surprising
that they could make little headway into the issue at hand.
is it a home or a factory? why „as this distinction
important? Lioeral ideology posited a fairly strict
distinction between the public and private worlds, and
assigned economic relations to the former and normative
emotional relations to the latter. Women, as part of the
private sphere of the home, were supposed to stand outside
of, or be immune from, contractual public relations. Work
that women did at home-whether it was unpaid domestic
labor or manufacturer's homework—was not thought of as
ork proper
—work that had real economic value. This
very definition of work was based in the distinction (and
separation) of the public and the private, the home and
the factory. Homework violated this presupposition by
l iterally introducing economic relationships into the heart
of the family. To admit this reality, then, meant that
the ideological distinction between the public and private
worlds might also be called into question.
Furthermore, an admission of this sort could also
justify the idea that the State had a responsibility to
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directly regulate
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in large part, the ideological distinction between
public work and privatized family „as based in real material
transformations in the nature of social production. In
precapitalist agrarian society, the home was the site of
production. Entire families farmed, raised livestock,
spun and weaved, and produced the goods the family needed
for daily use. In addition, families often produced goods
for exchange at the market.
With the rise of the factory and wage-labour system,
home production of this sort gradually declined. While
there remains some controversy over the extent to which
the family and home was emptied of its economic functions
,
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it is clear that in important ways the home did lose its
status as the center of production
.
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Women, of course, continued to perform domestic
household tasks, such as cooking, cleaning, and caring
for their families. But as the wage-labour system developed
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outside of the home, the domestic labor of women came to
be defined as separate from and qualitatively different
than "outside" labor done for a wage. Women's household
tasks were systematically undervalued, then, as the idea
of "work" came to be defined strictly in terms of wage-
labour done in the public sphere-physically and ideolog-
ically separated from home.
Conclusions
A number of explanations could be put forth to
explain why- these women worked at home: that their husbands
prohibited their employment outside the home; that manu-
facturers preferred not to employ married women; that forms
of child care were not available to them; that they preferred
homework because of the lack of direct supervision and/or
because they felt that their presence in the home was neces-
sary for family unity and the maintenance of cultural norms.
While none of these explanations are mutually exclusive,
it is necessary to develop a more comprehensive and coherent
explanation for why these women worked at home.
At a more fundamental level of analysis, one needs
to understand how the ideology of motherhood served to
shape women's options for work. Women, especially once
they were married, were primarily identified as mothers --
whether or not they actually bore children. Married women
were expected to be supported by husbands and to dedicate
bulk of their time to household and childcare duties.
Expecting to fulfill this cultural prescription, women
Often voluntarily left the workforce upon marriage. But
the working class immigrant in particular material
reality would not allow them to live up to cultural expec-
tations. While the ideology of motherhood and the day-to-
day needs of the family required that they remain at home,
economic necessity pushed them towards wage-earning. The'
economy, itself based on the assumption that women with
children would remain at home, was not structured to absork
women with familial responsibilities. The length of the
working day, the lack of childcare facilities, the market
preference for full-time, year-round workers in the factor
all served in very explicit ways to limit the options of
mothers for work. Homework was one of the few systems
of work that could form any sort of compromise between
these competing pressures.
The logic of capital alone cannot explain the level
of exploitation of homeworkers. It cannot explain why
single women in the factory (in the flower industry, for
instance) were paid 40% more than married women at home
doing exactly the same work. This disparity in wages can
only be explained in reference to women's identification
as mothers. The sexual division of labor which formed
the basis for women's identification as mothers not only
kept them home, but justified their extremely low wages
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once employed at homework, while women in factories sys-
tematically earned less than men, homeworkers, one step
removed from the production process and public view, earned
less than factory workers. A mother, as such, was not
supposed to be the primary wage-earner for the family (or
for herself for that matter.) The payment of low wages
would insure that she could not. Manufacturers testifying
before the New York State Commission conveniently allowed
themselves to believe that homeworkers worked for "pin
money," despite the mass of evidence to the contrary
.
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The ideology of motherhood, as it helped to create,
justify, and perpetuate the homework system, defined women
a juriori as outside of the wage-labour system. Consequently,
when women did enter it, they would remain always in a
subordinate position. Women's position in the industrial
workforce, then, was intimately related to her relationship
to the patriarchal family. Industrial capitalists reaped
the benefits of this ideological committment by the payment
of low wages and the maintenance of large "peripheral"
workforce existing at the edge (or more accurately, at the
bottom) of the mainstream of workers. The association
of homeworkers with the private sphere rendered them invis-
ible from both contemporaries and historians as a large,
exploited sector of the workforce.
Historians have characterized the Italian immigrant
family as among the most strictly patriarchal. Women were
forbidden to go out alone, husbands and fathers were suspl
clous of single women working in factories without direct
family supervision, and wives were rarely allowed to go
out to work. Although recent studies have found that
Italian wives went out to work more often than assumed,
it is still clear that Italian women were viewed by their
husbands-
-and often view themselves—as the "heart" of
the family. For these women, the homework system was
suited to the irregular demands of household and family
responsibilities. Ostensibly, women could cook, clean
launder, and care for the family at the same time they
earned a wage. And the low wages they earned meant that
they could earn an income without threatening their husband
identification as primary wage-earner.
From tne point of view of the needs of the patriar-
chal family-
-where father was the breadwinner and mother
the caretaker of the family— the homework system provided
a way to integrate traditional norms with the reality of
modern capitalism, without threatening the power base of
the husband. But did homeworkers themselves prefer to
stay at home? After all, many other working class mothers
were in the labor force during this time period. This
is a more difficult question and one that probably can
never be definitively answered. But we can conjecture,
as every historian must, from the evidence at hand.
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First, it would be somewhat misleading to think
Of the circumstance of homeworkers as one of "choice."
Ideological constraints, the structure of the labor market,
the very real pressing daily needs of the family, tradi-
tional patriarchal norms, and manufacturers' preference
for young single women all served to restrict options for
paid work outside the home. For homeworkers and most work-
ing class women, life was ruled by necessity and not choice.
While these women may have preferred to stay home, „e may
rightfully ask, at what cost would they do so? Piecework
rates demanded that these women work at an intense rate
just to earn 6c an hour. Mothers—and their children—
worked from dawn until late in the evening. Homeworkers
were subject to the most extreme demands of the "double
day." These women workers vacillated between intense
periods of irantic work and periods when no work at all
could be found. The insecurity engendered by such irregular
work must surely have taken its toll on these women. Cer-
tainly, this system of work exacted certain costs to family
lif e
.
On the other hand, homeworkers could maintain the
psychological, cultural, and material unity of the family
by remaining at home. As Virginia Yans-McLaughlin has
pointed out, the Italian family has been described as
father-dominated, but mother-centered."^^ Italian women
may well have viewed their predominance within the family--
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over care of children and husband-as an important source
of power. Their hesitancy to relinquish this central po-
sitron in the family by going out to work may reflect a
realistic assessment of their situation. After all, in
the labor market women could barely earn a living wage
and were under the constant scrutiny of bosses or foremen.
Moreover, the possibilities of earning an independent wage
were limited even at the peak of their wage-earning years
and steadily declined as they passed marital age. Retaining
the stability of the family represented a kind of long-
term security that the market could never provide. Children,
who were taught at an early age that they were responsible
for the economic survival of the family, could be expected
to (and did) support parents in old age.
In addition, women often worked together at home
with neighbors or relatives. ^ Homework provided a way
to establish and maintain extended family ties that must
certainly have been important for the survival of individual
family members. Going out to work might have disrupted
or threatened these extended networks, either through a
violation of cultural norms or simply by being absent from
the home for long periods of time. This need to maintain
reciprocal social relationships with friends and family
may have played a significant role in keeping women at home.
Given the benefits to manufacturers and to the
patriarchal family of this system of work, homework evolved
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as the one viable alternative for these women. Had it
not been for the sexual division of labor in the family,
which placed sole responsibility for childcare and house-
hold duties on women, and the logic of capitalist wage-
labour, which drove down the price of labour to a point
approaching slavery, the homework system may have been
an attractive alternative for these women. Given these
considerations, homework remained an exploitative form
of work almost without parallel during this time period.
Certainly the ability of homeworkers to negotiate the
conflicting pressures of their situation is a testimony
to their strength and the importance of their contribution
to the very survival of the working class immigrant family.
CHAPTER in
NO PLACE FOR WOMEN: PROTECTIVE
LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN,
NEW YORK, 1 900-1 925
Introduction
It is often in times of great social upheaval that
dominant ideas about the nature of our social order become
most visible and explicit. The rapid industrialization
and urbaizat ion of the U.S. combined with the influx of
women into the industrial workforce to serve as a catalyst
for just such a period in New York at the turn of the
century. it is in this context of social, political, and
economic transformation that the development of protective
legislation must be understood. If women's entrance into
the industrial workforce in large numbers was not to disrupt
women's primary identification with the home, then efforts
would have to be made by a vairety of actors, each compelled
by different motivations, to insure that women's work lives
were somehow consonant with v/omen's duties as wife and
mother
.
When social convention weakens, lav; often steps
in its place to reinforce traditions viewed by the state
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as necessary to the maintenance of social order. in this
chapter, protective labor legislation for women will serve
as a case in point. Laws to prohibit women's work, for
instance, in mines or iron foundries or to keep women from
working all through the night at paid labor outside the
home, did not become necessary until social convention
weakened enough to allow women into these occupations in
the frrst place. Though the state was limited by a variety
of forces, each of which will be explored throughout this
chapter, it could at least place serious obstacles in the
way of women who either out of conviction or necessity
engaged in "men's" work. Through a review of protective
legislation in New York from the turn of the century through
the 1920's I hope to illustrate how the state responded
to what was perceived as a threat to the patriarchal social
order
.
As I have argued in the preceding chapter, women's
primary identification with the private sphere of the home
played an important role in the formation of state policy
regarding homeworkers. The question to which we must now
turn in order to fill out the picture is how this association
of women with the private sphere affected her position
in the more visible public world of work. In particular,
how did state policy both reflect and help to perpetuate
women's primary role in the home and secondary position
in the labor market?
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The questions I will raise through my study of
protective labor legislation for women will be intimately
related to questions raised in the preceding chapters.
As we have seen, dominant ideology drew a sharp distinction
between "home and factory." m addition, at least in the
ideal, mothering and wage-earning were viewed as antithetical
.
Ihis conflict between "women as mothers" and "women as
workers" will be developed more fully in this chapter.
In addition, my project will also address the question
of what affect women’s status as mothers had on her standing
as a ci tizen
. In other words, could women's primary asso-
ciation with and responsibility for the privatized family
be consistent with her formal rights within the classical
liberal tradition (as I have outlined in chapter one) as
a free, autonomous individual? Or is there a necessary
antithesis between women's identification with the private
sphere and her standing as a full citizen (that is, as
an autonomous individual who has full rights and privileges
in the formal political sphere)? If such an antithesis
exists, then we will be forced to question whether state
policy based on women's role as mother (and aimed at rein-
forcing this role) has reinforced her political, economic,
and social inequality as a whole.
As a contrast to the state's exemption of home-
workers from all forms of protective labor regulation,
I will review in this chapter the state's willingness to
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enact protective labor leaisl aH nn „g faiatio for women working outside
the home in New York from 1 900 through the 1920' s. As
we shall see, efforts to restrict the labor of women gen-
erally took two forms during this time period. The first,
outright prohibitions on women from working in certain
industries or at particular jobs, was the most extreme
form of restriction and while less common helps to illus-
trate the logic underlying all forms of protective labor
legislation for women in New York. I will begin this chapter
then with a discussion of prohibitive legislation for women.
This study will establish a "paradigm" case of the logic
underlying protective legislation upon which less restrictive
but by far more common laws were enacted.
The second type of legislation, by far the most
predominant and important in terms of its impact on women's
work, was the limitation of the hours women could work,
or "regulatory" legislation. I will illustrate the general
outlines of such legislation through both a study of New
York laws and a look at the one precedent-setting U.S.
Supreme Court case, Muller vs. Oregon, which in 1907 upheld
the constitutionality of the ten hour day for women and
acted as a powerful catalyst to protective legislation
in New York and nationwide.
Prohibitive Legislation
From the turn of the century through the 1920's
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the state would be convinced time and again that the only
way to "protect" the health of working women was to prohibit
them entirely from certain occupations. Beginning in 1899
all females were prohibited from "operating or using polish-
ing or buffing wheels" which were generally used in a variety
ot industries to sharpen the tools of labor. This act
marked the first time legislation explicitly prohibited
the employment of all women in an industrial occupation
in New York. In 1 906 women were excluded from working
for or in connection with mines and quarries, in 1912 they
were prohibited from working within four weeks after child-
birth in any "factory, mercantile establishment, mill or
workshop" and in 1913 after a lengthy study by the New
York Factory Investigating Commission (F.I.C.), women were
excluded from work in the core-rooms of brass, steel, and
iron foundries.
Young women also found themselves excluded from
certain occupations, often undercutting opportunities to
gain the experience needed to move into certain skilled
jobs once they reached maturity. Women under 21 were
prohibited from cleaning moving machinery in 1 887, and by
1 91 8 from working as messengers for telegraphs or messenger
companies in the distribution, transmission, or delivery
of goods or messages. In 1919 they viere barred from working
in connection with the operation of "elevated railroads"
or street subways and could not even sell or accept fares
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or admissions in any railway station, car, or train. 1
Though the categorical exclusion of women from
particular industries was not widespread, and perhaps never
directly affected the great number of women working in
industry, the logic and controversy over such legislation
is illustrative of all legislation enacted to "protect”
women. Because the exclusion of women from work in core-
rooms of foundries inspired much public debate and contro-
versy, I Will focus here on the enactment of these laws
and assess the effects of this legislation on women's
position in certain sectors of the workforce. As we shall
see, public debates over prohibitive legislation slip all
too easily from a discussion of the health and safety of
women workers to debates about women's "proper" position
in the labor market and role in the family. m particular,
often heated arguments over women’s work in core-rooms
belie a logic more attuned to a dominant "ideology of
motherhood" and the protection of male workers from female
competitors, than to a concern for the health of women
workers
.
In March of 1911 the disastrous fire at the Triangle
Shirtwaist lactory, in which 146 women died, sent more
than 100,000 working women and their supporters into the
streets of New York to demand improvements in the conditions
of working women. The outrage inspired by this event over
the health and safety of women workers led to the establish-
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the factory Investigating Commission of New York
and marked 1 91 1 as a hallmark year in struggles over pro-
tective legislation for women. The Commission, composed
of members of state government as well as representatives
from organized labor, engaged in a broad range of investi-
gations and made recommendations to the state legislature
for mture legislation.
In its second report the F.l.c. focussed attention
on the work of women in the core-rooms of foundries through-
out New York. The fear of tuberculosis, as in the case
or homeworkers, again acted as a catalyst for legislation.
Approximately three hundred women were employed in the
core-rooms of foundries in upstate New York. Concern over
the health of these workers focussed on the hazards of
the inhalation of gases and fumes from the ovens in which
cores were baked. 2 Women's recent entrance into foundry
work, where they typically replaced boys under 18, their
underpayment by manufacturers in this industry, and a social
and political climate sensitive to the high tuberculosis
rate in this industry all led to an extensive investigation
of women working in core-rooms by the F.I.C. High death
and illness rates from tuberculosis, rheumatism, and kidney
diseases were common among all those who worked near core-
room ovens. But women, the Commission argued, were espe-
cially vulnerable to these ailments because of their more
fragile physiology.
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The political divisions spawned by the Commission
. s
investigation of women foundry workers would be reproduced
n-any times in the years to follow over subsequent debates
over protective legislation. Manufacturers opposed any
legislation which would curb their riaVu- 4-^un ght to contract "freely"
with women workers. Organized male workers, fearful of
competition from "cheaper" female labor, were adamant in
their support of prohibitive legislation,
and male workers were well-represented in
Both owners
testimony before
the Commission,
to testify before
foundry workers.
And 01 the hundreds of witnesses called
the Commission only three were women
and these were dismissed after only cursory
testimony
.
The thousands of pages of testimony before the
f.I.C. leave us with a rich record of the arguments both
for and against legislation. Organized male workers,
represented by the Moulder's Union of New York, based their
opposition on a mixture of ideas about women
' s proper place
in the home, fear that women workers would lower wage stan-
dards, and a dubious concern over the health of these "future
motners of the race." As one core maker stated, "i think
(the boss) would do us a great favor, and everybody else
in New York, if he would let these girls go home, and take
care of the home, and not work in the shop but take care
of the homes where they should be ." 3
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Another member of the Moulder's Union expressed
concern, tempered by ethnocentrism, over the state of
motherhood: "„e must also realize that these women of to-
day, even though they are the Slavs and Poles and the Italians,
they are the mothers of the future American citizens ." 4
while male foundry workers softened their arguments with
a concern for motherhood, the bottom line was economic.
Women pieceworkers systematically earned only half to one-
third of what their male counterparts earned. And the
blame for such underpayment was laid on the heads of women
workers who, the Union argued, didn't have either the courage
or choice to demand higher wages. As W. T. Provert of
the Brooklyn Moulder's Union argued,
;;;!
here
a
m
!u
have the coura9 e of their own convic-10ns and the right to demand it, the girls arenor in that position, and they will stay therewnether they like conditions or not; they don'thave the courage to jump on a freight and go some-where else.
. .
.
( they ) have to make the best ofconditions given to them in those shops. Theyhave no choice. y
Needless to say, the attitude of union men didn't help
the sltuaLion of these women workers any. Not only were
women barred from the union, but the constitution of the
International Moulder's Union threatened to expel any
member who "devotes his time in part or in whole to the
instruction of female help in the foundry or at any branch
of the trade.
Manufacturers recognized the increased profitability
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Of hiring women workers who were not only "cheaper" to
employ than men but cheaper even than boys. And certainlv
a sexually divided workforce could do the Union no good.
In response to Union accusations, foundry owners defen-
sively argued that women were employed either because they
couldn't get boys to do the job, or because women were
handier, more skillful, and more regular in their work"
(though apparently owners weren't willing to compensate
women for these superior qualities
.)
7
Manufacturers accused male workers of discrimination
against women and argued that no account should be taken
of sex in the core-room. Owners argued that they wanted
"equal rights" for both men and women and urged the Commis-
sion not to make foundry work a "matter of sex ." 8 Some
went so far as to argue that any legislation should apply
equally to both men and women, certainly with the knowledge
that such restrictive legislation for men would never be
tolerated. They argued that core-room work was not a threat
to health and that it paid better than other occupations
available to women, such as work in canneries, laundries,
or work as a scrubwoman (a point not without merit
.)
9
But as one report of the Women's Bureau stated,
employers' opposition to protective legislation was "appar-
ently just as altruistic as that of the moulders. They
wished to give women the "opportunity" to work in core-
When push came to shove in testimony beforerooms
.
the F.I.C. employers reluctantly admitted that women were
mployed simply because they were cheaper to employ.
Clearly, concerns about "equal opportunity" and "dilcrim-
ination" acted only as a veneer over their more fundaments!
commitment to profit-making.
Though the battles between owners and male foundry
workers were clearly based in economics, with a guise of
concern for the health and safety of women workers, the
Commission's final assessment rested exclusively on strict
assumptions about women's "proper" place in the family
and the workforce, and the state’s obligation to "protect"
the future of the race. In its conclusion the F.I.C. 's
report bluntly stated that "the foundry is no place for
women" and that everyone would have been better off if
women had never been allowed to enter an occupation which
was "never intended for them ." 11 When faced with arguments
made by manufacturers in the name of "equal rights," the
Commission invoked the eternal rules of Nature : 12
Nature itself has made distinctions which thefoundry owner has said should not be made. In-
stincts of chilvary and decency as well as
concern for the preservation of the race, demandthat we should not permit women to engage in
work detrimental to their health, that overtaxes
rheir strength, and impairs their vitality as
wives and mothers.
Concluding that every obstacle should be thrown in the
way of women foundry workers, the F.I.C. recommended the
gradual elimination of the three hundred women employed
in foundries in New York. Such harsh conclusions are es-
pecially interesting when understood in the context of
the fact that the Commission itself admitted that it had
failed to prove that work in the core-room was detrimental
t0 W ''"'“ n 3 health
’
or that women were more susceptible
to illness than male workers in the same industry. Remembc
also that the prohibition is based not on health concerns
~
lreCt1^ related to reproductive capacities, but to gases
and fumes which irritate the mucous membranes, eyes, nose
and throat, and bronchial passages. Strictly physiological
evidence alone, therefore, could not provide the basis
for gender-based legislation. Rather, the Commission stood
on the grounds that the foundry was simply "no place for
women." When one manufacturer argued that men and women
were no different in their susceptibility to illness, the
chairman, replying with sarcasm and incredulity, laid out
in no uncertain terms the true basis of their reasoning: 13
You really think they are no different. Youknow there is a particular interest we have in
a girl. The girl of to-day is the mother ofto-morrow. She produces our children, and wehave got to preserve her a little better if we
are going to have good future citizens.
At the recommendation of the Commission, the state
passed a law in 1913 that prohibited women's employment
in the oven rooms where cores were baked and regulated
the size and weight of cores on which women could work. 14
While not directly prohibiting women from work in brass,
steel, and iron foundries (which would have forced the
state to take direct responsibility for throwing three
hundred women immediately out of work) these restrictions
were effective enough to eliminate women from work on cores
within a few short years.
EVen given the strong language of the F.X.C.’s
final assessment of women's foundry work, it would be some-
what misleading to view the Commission’s work as a simple
attempt to force women back into the home. m a very real
sense both Commission members and legislators responded
with shock and honest concern over the health hazards of
this kind of work. Members of the F.I.C. were led on tours
through foundries and factories and, perhaps for the first
time, had a real life taste of the degradation wrought
by industrial work. It is plausible that their harsh re-
action to the employment of women in core-rooms, for in-
stance, was due at least in some part to the impression
left on them by conditions of core-room work in general:
men and women literally "spent" a lifetime working in the
nauseating heavy blue smoke that "just seemed to lay there"
after oven doors had been opened
.
15
Unwilling to inter-
fere in the "freedom of contract" of male workers, commis-
sioners turned their ire towards efforts to at least pro-
tect the "weaker sex." Ironically, in their haste to
improve the condition of women workers they failed to make
any recommendations for protecting the health and safety
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of the remaining male workers. In the end, fathers were
sacrificed in the name of protecting motherhood.
The debates over women foundry workers set a pattern
that would be followed in all subsequent struggles over
protective legislation for women. Unionised male workers,
arguing that women's physiology ill-suited her for indus-
trial work, supported legislation out of fear that women
workers would either drive down wages, displace male workers,
or both. Manufacturers, arguing on the grounds of equal
opportunity, fought legislation in order to advance profits
through the exploitation of women workers. And the state,
receptive to dominant beliefs about women's physical infer-
iority and proper place in the home, felt compelled to
protect women on the grounds that the state had an obligation
to preserve the future of the race by restricting the work
lives of the mothers, or future mothers, of its citizens.
This pattern is repeated time and again in all
subsequent attempts to restrict women's labor. But in
regard to less severe restrictions on women's work, such
as the limitation of the total hours worked in a day or
week, or the prohibition of night work for women, the issues
become more complicated. For one thing, working women
themselves joined the battle--both for and against--pro-
tective legislation. In addition, hour and night work
laws held the promise of improved working conditions for
many women and, in some cases, paved the way for higher
standards of work for industrial workers.
Regulatory Legislat i nn—
Night Work Laws
The second form of legislation designed to regulate
women's work came in the form of the restriction of night
work for women and laws limiting the maximum hours women
could work in a given day or week Hiahi- .y . N ght work and maximum
hour laws often came hand in hand, primarily because it
was extremely difficult for inspectors to determine the
total hours a woman worked without a definite closing hour,
after which all work was illegal. Also, without night
work laws women could be required to work two continuous
days back to back, one before midnight and the other after,
thereby undercutting the intent of hour laws. In this
section, I Will briefly review night work laws before going
on to a discussion of the charged political battles over
the establishment of the ten-hour and nine-hour days for
women
.
In 1899 the first law was enacted in New York which
prohibited the work of all women in factories between
9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. 16 while previous legislation had
prohibited the night work of women under 21 (and males
under the age of 18), this was the first effort made by
the state to restrict the night-time employment of all
adult women. From 1899 through 1907 these laws went un-
challenged in New York State. But in one of the few court
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decisions of the time which explicitly argued women's
essentia! eguality with men in terms of a woman's freedom
of contract, the New York Court of Appeals ruled in 1907
in New York vs. Williams that all night work laws for women
over 21 were an unfair abridgement of women's freedom con-
tract
.
In its decision the Court stated that
» ward
,
of» ^s-ss ls
Following on the heels of the 1905 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Lochner vs. New York (which struck down a ten-
hour day for men) the New York Appeals Court declared that
this restriction went beyond the state's legitimate police
powers because the regulation was not based in the pro-
tection of women's health and safety. Labor legislation
which restricted freedom of contract could only legiti-
mately be justified if the intent of the law could be
explicitly tied to health and safety measures. Up to
this point in time, therefore, laws could only be upheld
for occupations categorized as "overhazardous" (as in the
case of miners in the 1 898 Holden vs. Hardy decision) or
if a certain class of workers, such as children or women,
could be deemed overly vulnerable to the hazards of work.
When the Factory Investigating Commission of New
York was reconvened in 1913 their first task was to rees-
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on these grounds. Encouraged by the 1908 u.s. Supreme
court decision in Muller vs. Oregon, which had upheld a
ten-hour day for women and presumably reversed the trend
set by the Williams case, the F.I.C. in 1913 recommended
passage of a new night work law for women. The arguments
used by the Commission were two-pronged. First, night
work threatened the health of women and the children they
were responsible for. The reoort nf np oi the Commission documents
the most extreme degradation wrought by women's "double
day." In their study of one hundred women working at night
in upstate New York the Commission found that these women
on the average slept only four and a half hours per day. 18
Most of these night workers, who were Polish immigrants
between the ages of 20 and 30, were married and had young
children to care for. For women with primary responsi-
bilities for infants and toddlers, night work provided
a solution to the conflict between income-earning and
mothering. Almost all of the women interviewed by the
F.I.C. stated that they preferred night work because it
freed them to nurse infants, cook, clean, launder, and
watch over their families during the day. Needless to
say, such a schedule left little time for rest or sleep.
In addition to the health hazards to women working the
graveyard" shift, the Commission also argued that the
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absence of night work laws led to the overtime wort of
women. In the bookbinding trade, for instance, women were
found working shifts often as long as 16-24 hours a day. 19
In addition to the health hazards created by over-
work, the Commission this time introduced a new theme into
arguments for protective legislation, pointing out that
"it has universally been found that such work renders women
liable to unusual moral dangers and temptations." 20 Re-
turning home in the dark of night left women vulnerable
to harassment or attack on the streets. In addition, the
Commission pointed out that no "respectable" boarding house
would allow women to return home after work past midnight,
m short, night work threatened the public welfare because
it was "destructive of the vitality of women as wives and
mothers" not only physically, but also morally.
As a result of the Commission's recommendations,
in 1913 and 1914 night work laws were passed which forbade
women's employment in factories and mercantile establish-
ments arter 10 p.m. or before 6 a.m. By 1917 and 1918
these restrictions were extended to include women working
in restaurants, on street railroads, as women messengers,
elevator operators, and women working as printers in news-
21papers. Laws of this nature were always accompanied
by exemptions, particularly in industries where women
presumably could not be replaced by men, or in industries
where owner or worker opposition was strong. Sales clerks
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were exempt during the Christmas rush; women working in
canning factories were exempt during harvest seasons;
singers, performers and cloak room attendants in hotels
were exempted entirely from the law. As in all forms of
protective legislation, night work laws improved conditions
in some industrial occupations in which women already
predominated (such as sales clerks in stores) and excluded
women entirely from other higher-paying work (such as train
conductors and printers in newspapers.)
As in prohibitive legislation, night work laws
were often initiated by organised male workers who feared
competition from women. Male waiters in New York City,
for instance, were well-served by night work restrictions
on women. Members of the Magnolia Association of Waiters
had repeatedly made requests to the New York Department
of Labor asking that women's work hours be restricted be-
cause, they argued, waitresses were undercutting pay rates
in their occupation. 22 Waitresses unsuccessfully protested
the extention of night work laws to their profession,
arguing that it often prevented them from working shifts
when tips were heaviest and pointing out the irony of the
law in that it allowed women singers to perform after
10 p.m. in the same restaurants where waitresses were
prohibited. 23 Without organization and funding the wait-
resses would lose their battle against night work restric-
tions
.
Women printers, who were included in the 19,3 law,
were also harmed by night work laws. Because newspapers
’
were run on two night shifts (one beginning at 6 or 7 p.m.
and the other at 2 a.m.) and only one day shift, night
work laws severely restricted opportunities for women to
work in this industry. In addition, weekly wages were
higher during the night than during the day, ranging from
$55 during the day to $58 and $61 at night. Prohibition
of night work also threatened the seniority status of women
printers. These working women, already anomalies in the
highly-paid male-dominated newspaper business, found them-
selves either at a serious disadvantage or were thrown
out of work entirely. Partly as a result of their ability
to finance a campaign against night work laws, these women
were able to win an exemption for women printers in 1921
after spending $10,000 on eight years of political work. 24
While night work was clearly detrimental to the
health of the many women who earned an income throughout
the night and returned home to domestic duties during the
day, the logic used to pass these laws did little to expand
che options of these women for work. Legislators never
felt obliged to discuss how the children of working mothers
would be cared for if these women had to work during the
day. In addition, legislators assumed that these women
were ignorant of the health hazards of night work and
therefore were themselves responsible for their own degrada-
tion
.
women can
As the F.I.C. stated in 1913, "Ignorant
scarcely be expected to realize the dangers not only to
their own health but to that of the next generation fro,„
such inhuman usage." 25 The fault of such "inhuman usage"
was thus placed squarely on the head<=; of* n aas l ignorant" mothers.
With the enactment of night work laws the state
fully elaborated the logic underlying all subsequent hour
laws: first, women were both physically and morally unable
to bear the strain of night-time work and therefore needed
the state's special protection "for their own good;" second,
the state had an explicit interest in protecting motherhood,
per se-and women who worked all through the night certainly
could not also be "good" wives and mothers during the day.
Legislation was enacted, therefore, on the grounds of the
state
' s direct interest in the private sphere of the home.
Any paid labor that women did that interfered with her
presumed functions as a mother would be ruled a threat
to the general welfare" of society and the state. The
same logic would be used to push through the nine-hour
and ten-hour day for women only.
Regulatory Legislation--
Hour Laws
Struggles over the establishment of the shorter
working day for women must be understood in the context
of earlier attempts to shorten the working day for men.
While prohibitive and night work lav/s were designed explicitly
for women, and no attempts were ever made to extend such
laws to men, maximum hour laws had been a long sought after
goal of predominantly male unions prior to the turn of
the century. Hour laws did not become explicitly gender-
based until after 1899, and the movement to extend such
laws to women in all factory and mercantile occupations
in New York did not gain full steam until after 1910.
As previously noted, laws restricting freedom of
contract, at least for men, could only be upheld if they
were viewed as necessary for the health and safety of „ork ei
Organized labor throughout the nation was dealt a harsh
blow by the now- famous U.S. Supreme Court case, Lochner
VS. New York, in 1905. In this case the Court ruled as
unconstitutional the limitation of bakers to ten hours
per day, or sixty hours of work per week. In its decision
the court stated that such restrictions constituted "an
unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with
the right and liberty of the individual to contract in
relation to his labor " 26
Ihe decision in the Lochner case brought to life
some of the most fundamental commitments of the classical
liberal tradition: as independent individuals men were
entitled to freedom from state interference in their rights
to contract "freely" with others. Specifically, capital
and labor, on equal footing within the marketplace,
were entitled to bargain freely over wages, hours, and
the conditions of labor without the interference of the
state. Organized labor found the going rough in attempts
to threaten or even modify what was then perceived by legis
lators, courts, and businessmen as the cornerstone of the
laissez-faire political and economic system. Finding the
courts unsympathetic to their cause, unions and social
reformers turned their efforts towards the limitation of
women's labor. If they could not win the ten-hour day
for men, they could at least do so, with the help of well-
entrenched beliefs about women's inferiority, for women.
In New York state, hour laws for women had followed
the same historical pattern as night work laws. In 1899
all women were prohibited from working more than ten hours
a day or sixty hours a week in any factory. But allowances
for overtime work (up to twelve hours a day) in order to
make a shorter day at the end of the week made this law
almost totally ineffective. Such exemptions made it almost
impossible for inspectors to determine the total number
of hours each woman worked in a given week. In addition,
state officials were reluctant to prosecute violators for
fear that the law could not stand up to a challenge in
court. In 1907 the law was amended to restrict labor to
six days a week, but again the law remained gutless because
of the continuation of overtime provisions.
Where the U.S. Supreme Court had been reluctant
to tread in the case of male workers, it reversed its stand-
mg just two years later when addressing legislation ex-
plicitly designed to restrict the work of women. m a
case that would set the stage for protective legislation
nationwide and change the current of judicial thinking
on legislation for women, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
in 1908 in the Muller vs. Oregon decision that a ten-hour
day for women was constitutional. The reasoning of the
Muller decision would inform such legislation for the next
twenty years, and so deserves special attention.
Josephine Goldmark, of the National Consumer's
League, and attorney Louis Brandeis teamed up to produce
the brief that would convince the Court of the validity
of special legislation for women, in spite of the Court's
previous ruling in the Lochner case. Citing only two pages
of law and over one hundred pages of "scientific" evidence,
Brandeis and Goldmark argued women's special vulnerability
to overwork and, hence, her need for the special protection
of the state.
The ability of the Court to override the logic
of the Lochner decision rested first in the task of proving
that women's health differed from men's. Brandeis and
Goldmark's brief began, then, with arguments that women
were physically inferior to men, and therefore were subject
to greater health and safety risks than men. Fully adopting
the logic of the brief, the Court argued that
the functions b^perform^bv* °f „
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30^7 t0 "ai”tai “ the struggle for
And the Court concluded that "this difference justifies
a difference in legislation." As the Court pointed out,
natural differences between men and women placed women
at a distinct disadvantage in the "struggle for subsistenc.
and therefore required her protection by the state. That
this disadvantage was rooted in nature and not social
convention was clearly evident in their ruling.
Not only did women's "physical structure" conspire
against her in the marketplace, but her maternal function
Played an important role in undercutting her bargaining
power and justifying the regulation of her labor. The
Muller decision made explicit the direct interest the state
had in reproduction and, therefore, in women's work.
Reluctance to interfere with women's freedom of contract
couldn't hold a candle to concerns over the maintenance
of women s position as wives and mothers. As the decision
put it,
As healthy mothers are essential to vigorous off-
spring, the physical well-being of women becomes
an object of public interest and care in order topreserve the strength and vigor of the race. 28
Reproduction, or more accurately, the potential for reoro
auction, thus became a matter of explicit state interest.
The Muller decision reaffirmed, in essence, women's
status as wards of thp 4- Qr e state, and served as a catalyst
for the passage of protective legislation for women only
nationwide. As one justice stated in an Illinois court
decision that followed in the footsteps of Muller, "what
we know as men we cannot profess to be ignorant of as
judges." 29 The judge could not have been more accurate
in his assessment of the reasoning behind Muller.
in the eight years that followed the Muller decision,
forty-one states enacted new or improved protective laws
for women. In New York, a new spirit in favor of legislation
was rekindled. The force of the Muller decision combined
with the Triangle Fire, the establishment of the F.i.c.
and the concerted efforts of unions (both male and female)
to push the nine-hour day for women through the legislature
by 1913.
The American Federation of Labor had begun its
fight for protective legislation for women nationwide by
1900. rearing competition from women workers, unions saw
legislation as one way of controlling women's labor. As
Alice Kessler- Harris has pointed out, the AFL was opposed
to protective legislation for men, fearing that it might
undercut attempts at unionization, "But for women, whose
stay in the labor force was expected to be brief, legis-
lation could provide an attractive alternative to the
way in which
expense of organizing while it controlled the
women could enter the labor force and compete with men." 3 °
organizations such as the AFL were clearly self-interested
in their pursuit of legislative restrictions of women's
work
.
Although predominantly male unions had attempted
to pass the 54-hour week for women every year since 1901
in New York, they were not successful until they were joined
tneir efforts by the Women's Trade Union League and
the Consumer's League of New York. 31 Organizations such
as these viewed protective legislation as the most effective
means of improving conditions of work for wage-earning
women. The Women's Trade Union League, which had formed
m 1904 with the explicit intent of improving conditions
for women working in unorganized industries, made the passage
of the 54-hour law their first legislative priority. Toward
this effort, the WTUL formed the Joint Labor Legislative
Conference in 1911 which was a coalition of unions from
Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx, the United Hebrew
Trades, and the Socialist Party.
^
Regardless of their intentions, the arguments used
to pass legislation rested heavily on assumptions about
women s inferiority. Rose Schneiderman
, then-Vice-President
of the WTUL, argued explicitly that women "can't do the
same work as a man" and fought repeals of protective legis-
lation on the grounds that "equal rights cannot keep (women)
in work for which they are physically unfit." In addition,
she argued
, women who wanted to work at the same rate of
Pay or at the same hours as men would run the risk of
"putting their own brothers, or sweethearts, or future
husbands out of a gob."” The suppQrt Qf ^
therefore rested on both a rhetorical ^ cn cor concern for the pro-
tection of motherhood as well as a fear that unorganized
working women would drag down the price of labor. If unions
could not raise standards of work life in predominantly
female occupations, then manufacturers could be forced,
through the use of the state, to comply with certain minimum
standards of labor.
Unionists also argued that a reduction in hours
for women and children would inevitably lead to the reduction
of men's hours. While little hard data is available on
this question, evidence from a U.S. Women's Bureau report
of 1921 does indicate that hour laws for women did have
this effect in certain factories where women already predom-
inated. Manufacturers often found it impractical to
substitute an entire shift of women with men after 10 p.m.
,
and the lower cost of women's labor made it unprofitable
to wholly replace women with men in industries such as
textiles, where women predominated
.
Though organized labor often based their arguments
in economic concerns, the ideological vehicle used to pass
legislation was always founded in arguments about women's
physical inferiority and proper
force. Unions and social reform
women's capacity for motherhood
disadvantage in the workplace.
place in the home and work-
organizations argued that
placed her at a natural
While the immediate effect
Of legislation might be to improve working conditions for
at least some women in some industries, the broader effect
of such arguments was to reinforce dominant ideological
norms about women's "proper" role in the family as mothers
and to reinforce women's segregation and underpayment in
the labor market.
While the WTUL and its allies put pressure on legis-
lators, Josephine Goldmark again emerged with the scientific
foundation for these political battles. After her success
with the Brandeis brief (never referred to as the Goldmark
brief) in 1908, Goldmark went on to publish her definitive
work on the hazards of overwork for women, Fatigue and
Efficiency in 191 2. 35 Goldmark's work argued the "special
susceptibility to fatigue and disease which distinguishes
the female
,
qua female" and argued that this special vulner-
ability required their special protection by the state.
Her work, which had already been used to successfully defend
ten-hour and eight-hour laws for women in Illinois, Michigan,
Virginia, Louisiana, Ohio, Washington and California, found
equal success in New York. 36
Josephine Goldmark, along with then-Secretary of
the National Consumer's League, Florence Kelley, presented
forceful testimony before the F.I.C. and successfully
convinced Commission members to present the 54-hour week
to the state legislature.
The concern over women's reproductive capacities,
Which was voiced by all those in favor of legislation,
was clearly not limited to women who were actually mothers.
As one doctor stated in support of Goldmark's work,
Inr
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he emPloynlent of women from girlhood allth ough married life, and through the period ofchi ldbeanng--the continual stress and strain fwork and hours and general conditions prevailingin women's labour-that is exerting itfblnefi?9influence on the individual and on the home. 37
Concern over reproduction began well before puberty and
extended well past women's child-bearing years. And when
direct evidence of health risks to women were exhausted,
reformers and legislators turned to the effects of working
mothers on their children. Massive reports were produced
proving' the higher infant mortality rates of children
of working mothers. 38 Causal relationships were drawn
between sick and criminal children and the work of mothers.
While such studies might rightfully point out the ill-
effects (on women and children) of exploitative working
conditions, they were more often used to justify prohibitive
or restrictive lav/s for women. Such laws, therefore, were
justified not only on the grounds of women's health, but
on the grounds that this was the only way to protect the
children of working mothers.
The force of such arguments convinced the legislature
to pass the nine-hour day for women in 1912
, and by 1913
the law was extended to include all women working in mercan-
tile establishments as well
.
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Over the next fourteen
years, hour laws in New York would be expanded to include
women working in restaurants (1917), as messengers (1918),
to women working on street railroads and as elevator operl-
tors (1919).
from the late teens through the early 20' s in New
York, the WTUL and its allies would find itself rn opposi-
tion not only to manufacturers and conservative legislators,
but also to organizations composed of working women who
were opposed to protective legislation. In light of the
growing strength of opposition, the WTUL established the
Women's Joint Legislative Conference in 1918 in order to
advance and protect their efforts for protective legisla-
tion. This powerful coalition was composed of groups
well-experienced in legislative battles, such as the New
York State Women's Suffrage Party, the New York State and
City chapters of the Consumer's League, and the Young Women's
Christian Association, among others J 9
In 1 91 9 uhe Women s Joint Legislative Conference,
with the ardent support of then-Governor Alfred E. Smith
(a former member of the F.I.C.), submitted a package of
to the legislature which included extensions of night
work laws to women employed in offices, on elevators
and on transportation lines, a health insurance plan for
women, an eight-hour day and a bill which would establish
a minimum wage commission for women. 41 This package of
bills, dubbed "welfare bills" by opponents, found the going
rough. Hour laws were one thing, but health insurance
and minimum wages quite another.
First of all, manufacturers and private insurance
companies organized strong opposition through the establish-
ment of the New York League for Americanism. In addition,
under the Chairmanship of Senator Clayton R. Lusk, the
Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Seditious Activ-
ities was formed in the aftermath of the war. 42 With the
help of Senator Lusk, who accused proponents of the bills
of being oolshevists and German propagandists" the health
and minimum wage bills died in committee, with the force
of a Red Scare and the lucrative support of businessmen
behind him, Lusk declared that advocates of such welfare
bills "advocate the overthrow of the government.
.. (and)
would overthrow marriage." 43 while Lusk's tactics pre-
vented the eight-hour day, minimum wage, and health insur-
ance bills irom getting through, the 54-hour week was upheld
and night work laws were extended to cover women working
on elevators, in offices and in transportation in 1919.
Despite opposition, hour laws stood unaltered until 1927,
when women's hours were further reduced to eight hours per
day and forty-eight hours per week. 44
Though the opposition of businessmen was motivated
by the protection of profits, other groups opposed legis-
lation on very different grounds. By 1920 organizations
composed of working women voiced strong protests over pro-
tective legislation. It is to these protests and the divi-
sions they created among the working women of New York
that we can now turn.
Working Women Divided: yiif,,
vs. Protection" L
By 1920 businessmen opposed to protective legis-
lation were joined in their efforts bvu oy organizations composed
of working women who had been adversely affected by night
v/ork and hour laws. The first of these to be established
was the Women's League for Equal Opportunity (1915), who
argued that women workers had been displaced by the thousands
in New York City following enactment of the 54-hour and
night work laws. Composed primarily of women printers,
who, as previously discussed, had been seriously affected
by night work laws, this organization aruged that such
legislation protected men and not women, and called for
the repeal of all sex-specific labor legislation. As Miss
Ella M. Sherwin, a Brooklyn printer and first president
of the organization stated,
Welfare legislation, if persisted in, will protect
women to the vanishing point. Whatever its intent,
it can have but one outcome. It will drain women
out of all highly paid and highly organized trades,
because the lav/ will prevent them from doing the
same work that men do and the
nibit them from working for athe men.
unions will pro-
lower wage than
Another group which shared the sentiments of the
Women's League for Equal Opportunity was the
Association, founded in 1917 with the motto
Equal Rights
Give a Woman
a Man's Chance--Industrially .
"
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The Equal Rights Asso-
ciation,
trialists
also headed by a woman printer, joined with indus-
m advocating the repeal of all protective legis-
lation.
By far the largest and most powerful organization
to oppose protective legislation for women was the National
Woman's Party, led by Alice Paul. Following the ratification
of the 19th Amendment, the Woman's Party set out to eliminate
all remaining "disabilities and inequities" which women
suffered on account of sex. When the Women's Joint Legis-
lative Conference again submitted the eight-hour and minimum
wage bills in 1923, they were defeated by the combined
efforts of these three organizations in alliance with
industrialists and conservative legislators. In a savvy
political move, and one that reflected the radical nature
of the organization, the National Woman's Party supported
the bills, but only with the condition that the word "women"
be changed to persons" in all legislation.^^
In that same year the National Woman's Party sub-
mitted the Equal Rights Amendment (known then as the
Lucretia Mott Amendment) for the first time to the U.S.
House and Senate, demanding that "Men and Women shall have
equal rights throughout the U.S. and every place subject
to its jurisdiction." The Amendment was perceived as
a direct threat to all gender-based forms of protective
legislation, and the WTUL adamantly opposed it, along with
most other women's organizations nationwide, on the grounds
that it would invalidate all the gains won through the
enactment of special legislation for working women.
By 1924 the battlelines were drawn. For the first
time since the gender-based legislation was introduced
in New York in 1899, working women had a well-organized
and well-funded forum for expressing dissent over protects
legislation.
The Woman's Party pointed to the absurdity of pro-
tective legislation in that it applied to only certain
women in certain jobs. The N.W.P. called attention to
restrictions on waitresses as one case in point. As pre-
viously seen, it was only after waiters found themselves
being displaced by "cheaper" female labor that night work
laws were extended on the grounds that night work was no
longer safe for women. And while waitresses were dismissed
at 10 p.m.
,
singers could remain employed all through the
night. While waitresses, along with all female industrial
workers, were subject to these laws, no one was willing
to restrict low-paying "women's" work such as domestic
work, nursing, stenography, telephone operating, or theatri-
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cal work because, they argued, no men wanted these jobs.
"Who is prepared to say" one editorial asked, "that for
the welfare of the race.
. .no charwoman may be employed
after dark, in the City Hall, or the Capital or an office
building ?" 49
Because advocates of legislation based their argu-
ments on women's inherent frailties, no logic on their
own terms could justify such distinctions. In fact, the
N.W.P. argued, if the safety of women was truly the issue
then all women should be banned from the streets at night.
Or, better yet, efforts should be made to make the streets
safe for women after dark. In addition, those opposed
to protection pointed to the irony of the fact that "no
one got excited about the strength capacity of a woman
as long as she was doing the unpaid labor of the home."
And opponents asked, "why the whole world should be con-
cerned over her welfare just because she is getting paid
for her labor ." 50
Members of National Woman's Party argued that the
Equal Rights Amendment would not nullify protective legis-
lation but would require that such lav/s be extended to
include all workers, male and female
.
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They attacked
uhe physiological arguments used as a foundation for pro-
tective legislation, and argued that the most insidious
aspect of these laws was to treat all women as if they
were mothers
.
In a sweeping critique of restrictive laws
the Woman's Party argued:
In
5!
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since the vote was won. Now it is assumed' thatall women in industry are not only married Ware mothers, or are about to become so fpr'J 1 . .legislation) takes for granted motherhood as eCulveconstant corollary to womanhood and presupposesif we are to take the words of the oppositionor what they really mean, that all women in'industry are pregnant nearly, if not all, the time. 52
On classical liberal grounds, the Woman's Party pleaded
for women's right to freedom of contract regardless of
her sex or capacity for reproduction. in addition, oppo-
nents argued that the use of protective legislation as
either a substitute or complement to unionization was
fallacious. As Ada Wolff, head of the Equal Rights Asso-
ciation argued, women often included in such legislation
v/ere not competing with organized male workers. "On the
contrary, they are competing in the labor market with
unorganized and unorganizable men, and so legislation which
might be truly 'protective' if applied to workers becomes
a cruel handicap when applied to women only."^
Despite the well-financed efforts of the National
Woman's Party and industrialists, all efforts to repeat
protective legislation were unsuccessful. The strength
of support for protective laws was attested to by the fact
that even efforts clothed in patriotic rhetoric failed
to win suspension of women's labor laws during World War
I. Along With the failure to repeal night work and hour
laws for women, the N.W.P. also suffered losses in their
attempts to pass the ERA. The unified opposition Qf
every women's organization combined with the opposition
of many major unions to thwart the efforts of the N.W.P.
to pass a federal amendment. Opponents of the Amendment
argued that the ERA threatened all protective legislation
and "accused" members of the N.W.P. of being "theoretical"
feminists who would sacrifice concrete gains for working
women for the "abstract" cause of equality
.
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Despite
arguments made by the N.W.P. that the ERA would extend
protection to all workers, opponents argued that such an
Amendment would at least throw every hour law in the country
into long and expensive legal battles.
In the end, battles fought over labor legislation
for women would generate some strange political alliances.
Working women harmed by these restrictions found their
bosses to be their strongest allies; powerful women’s trade
unions found themselves tied to male unionists who would
have preferred to see women "stay home, where they belonged."
And while industrialists argued for women's equality with
men, progressive social reformers argued for women's inherent
frailty. Whether out of true conviction or sheer political
sense, arguments in favor of protective legislation for
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women only served to reinforce fhnt the grounds upon which women's
secondary status in the labor force was based. it was
only with the help of patriarchal ideology, which already
permeated the thinking of judges and legislators, that
advocates of protection could win their battles against
the powerful efforts of businessmen. Even after the suffrage
was won oy women, and even on strictly liberal grounds
that women were entitled to the same "freedom from inter-
ference" accorded men in the marketplace, opponents of
protective legislation could do nothing to sway the tide
Of logic in favor of protection.
Effec ts of Legislation
Given the confluence of social forces affecting
women's participation in the paid labor force, it is always
difficult to determine what effect any piece of legislation
has had on women's position in the workforce, and by ex-
tension, women's inequality in society as a whole. With
this qualification in mind, certain conclusions can still
be drawn about the effects of protective legislation in
New York at the turn of the century. And as the legis-
lation, political climate, and working conditions of women
in New York mirrored circumstances in states across the
nation during this time period, my conclusions here will
hold some validity for national trends during this time
period
.
must be placed
Any study Of the effects of hour laws
in the context of tendencies already set in motion by the
turn of the century towards a shorter working day for all
workers. Pressures from well-established unions and the
threat of spreading unionization combined with growing
beliefs about the increased efficiency of a shorter working
day to create a climate where manufacturers might "volun-
tarily" institute an eight or nine hour day without the
force of law. In a 1 923 study made by the New York Bureau
Of Women in Industry it was found that 56% of the women
working in manufacturing and mercantile establishments
worked 48 hours or less already, and that only 9% „ere
scheduled to work the legal maximum of 54 hours per week. 55
In addition, one New York State study indicated that a
majority of men also worked 54 hours per week or less. 56
Though unions such as the AFL had opposed hour laws that
restricted men’s work, their long history of pressuring
industrialists into a shorter working day did reduce hours
in some highly organized industries and certainly had a
strong impact on public opinion in general. In addition,
Josephine Goldmark's work in Fatigue and Efficiency con-
vinced many that an overworked laborer was an inefficient
worker, and that a reduction in hours could mean an increase
in profits. Studies such as Goldmark's coupled with the
growth of principles of scientific management during this
time period to reduce owner resistance to the shorter working
day. The impact of legislation must, therefore, be viewed
thin the context of a social setting already slanted
tor a variety of reasons towards the shorter working day.
Though hard evidence is scarce, one study made
by the U.S. women's Bureau in 1928 indicated the positive
effects of hour and night work legislation for women.
AS a result of political in-fighting between the National
Woman s party, in alliance with organizations representative
of well-educated career women, such as the Business and
Professional Women's Clubs, on the one hand and the Women’s
Trade Union League, the AFL and the National Consumer's
League on the other hand, the Women's Bureau was commissioned
to do a study of the effects of protective labor legis-
lation on women. With Mary Anderson (a long-time supporter
of protective legislation) at the helm of the Women's Bureau
the report concluded that not only women's but men's working
conditions had been improved by such legislation. 57
Though the findings of the report are politically
suspect, as it was headed by a strong supporter of protective
legislation, previous studies made by the New York Commis-
sioner of Labor indicated that the effect of legislation
pertaining to women working in mercantile establishments
had effectively restricted store hours to ten a day. In
general this meant that both men and women working in this
predominantly female occupation benefited from legislation. 58
In an interesting study of the census data in New
YOrk in 1910 “d 1 920
'
Eliz“ Fau lkner Baker found that
legislation
„,ay have had a more negative effect on women
working in factories. While the total number of women
employed in New York State increased 15.4% from 1910 to
1920 (in proportion to the increase in the female popu-
lation), the number of women working in factories during
the same period rose only 1%. And while the proportion
of women to men in the workforce increased, the proportion
of women to men working in factories decreased. 59
„hile
it is obvious that many factors must have contributed to
this shift, Baker points out that across the river in New
Jersey, where little protective legislation had been enacted,
the proportion of women working in factories kept pace
with the increase in the population of women and men, as
well as with the increase in women's employment in the
workforce as a whole. While it is impossible to tell what
part legislation played in this relatively small shift
of women out of factory work in New York, her study does
indicate that legislation may have played some role in
moving women into certain unregulated occupations, such
as clerical work. The largest proportional increase in
women working in an occupation according to the state report
was in clerical occupations, where women's employment
increased by 12% over the decade.
addition to shifts in women's occupational cate-
gories it is important to note that a reduction in the
legal working day for women in factories often meant a
reduction in pay. Though manufacturers sometimes increased
pay to compensate for lost time, a Women's Bureau study
of 1920 indicated that only half of the industries studied
nationwide increased pay rates after the introduction of
hour laws. Pieceworkers were particularly vulnerable,
as owners would often speed up work in an attempt to increase
productivity. Without wage increases, therefore, a shorter
working day often translated into a cut in pay or a work
speed-up. in industries such as the men's clothing trade,
no doubt homeworkers were used to make up for time lost in
the ractory. Though the National Consumer's League and
the WTUL had pushed for minimum wage laws, the U.s. Supreme
Court ruled against a District of Columbia law in 1923
(Adkins v. Children's Hospital) arguing that minimum wage
laws constituted "price fixing" and violated women's "free-
dom of contract." 01
In a decision that might seemingly undercut all
protective legislation, the Court argued that women had
acnieved equality with men through the 19th amendment and
therefore no longer needed special protection under the
law. Qualifying their argument just enough to validate
maximum hours and night work lav/s for women, the Court
argued that while physical differences between the sexes
were substantial enough to warrant protective legislation
they were not great enough to Justify the regulation of
wages. The Court thereby slipped through the cracks
in its own arguments and successfully prevented minimum
wage laws for men or women for nearly the next two decades.
Wherever factory workers retained wage levels at pre-hour
law rates they did so without the help of the courts,
through their own organized efforts.
While protective legislation improved conditions
of women working in predominantly female occupations such
as sales and reinforced tendencies towards a shorter working
day for women in factories, it is also clear that protective
legislation translated into serious setbacks for women
working in predominantly male occupations. As has already
been noted, prohibitive legislation threw women out of
work in foundries, mines and quarries, and effectively
excluded women from work in machine tool operations (because
of the prohibition on work with buffing and polishing
wheels.) In addition, women printers and transportation
workers also experienced the worst effects of this legis-
lation
.
In transportation the end of World War I combined
with the 54-hour law and night work prohibitions to throw
almost 1,000 women employed in transportation services
(as conductors, guards, ticket agents, and in "related
occupations") out of work. A study made by the New York
Bureau of Women in Industry made in 1 91 9 indicated the
adverse effects of doth women's displacement by men returning
home from the war and night work and hour restrictions.
While the end of the war accounted for over one-third of
tne women dismissed, many women were dismissed after the
effects of the war had passed, with the extension of laws
to include this occupation in 1919. By 1 920 the law was
amended to exempt all those women working in transportation,
excejat those women working as conductors or guards (of
course, the highest paid women.) m the end the effect
of legislation was to permanently ban over 500 women conduc-
tors and guards from the transit lines of New York. 63
Even by its own count, the Women's Bureau report
of 1928 entitled, The Effects of Labor Legislation on the
ESEloyment of Women 64 estimated that 60,000 women had lost
their jobs nationwide as a result of protective legislation.
Assuming the benefits to the remaining eight million working
women in the United States, the report concluded that the
gams of restrictive legislation far exceeded the sacri-
fices of these 60,000 women.
Clearly, the impact of protective legislation far
exceeded the women directly affected by these laws. As
Alice Kessler-Ilarris argues, women who were hardest hit
were often at the cutting edge of new economic opportunities
for women and their dismissal held serious implications
for challenging a sex-segregated labor market. 65 The numbers
or women dismissed couid not accurately reflect the future
opportunities for work lost by women as a whole. Pushed
out of higher paying and higher-skilled Jobs into "women's'
work, their bargaining power in the marketplace would be
reduced. In a self-fulfilling prophesy, their weakened
position could then be used to justify additional
"pro-
tection" by the state on the grounds that women were
naturally unfit tor work "never intended for them."
rne overall effects of protective legislation must,
therefore, be understood in the context of a broader sexual
division of labor: as long as women remained employed at
women s work," protective legislation would improve their
working conditions or leave them entirely free from regu-
lation; for women who challenged this sexual division of
labor, protection would translate into restriction. And
restrictions placed on a minority of women who had forced
their way into "male" occupations could have a broad effect
on future possibilities for working women. Eliminated
from these occupations, these women would be denied the
chance to challenge one of the most well-entrenched foun-
dations of women's inequality--a sex-segregated job market.
Conclusion-
-Motherhood
and the State
Had the simple aim of legislation been the improve-
ment of the health of women of child-bearing age one might
have expected the state to enact legislation for adequate
maternal leave nr* r'h-io xld care or campaigns to improve working
conditions themselves, rather than eliminating women from
certain jobs. Or if the aim of legislation was to protect
the "future of the raop"ce the result might have been concern
for the health of fathers as well as mothers. After all,
the health hazards working women were exposed to
also affected working men and had little to do with direct
threats to the female reproductive system. But clearly
the aim of legislation went beyond the health and safety
of mothers. Instead, laws were designed to reinforce
women's position in the home by restricting the kind of
work she could do outside of it.
While state policy could not insure that women
reproduced, it could at least encourage women to maintain
a particular kind of relationship to home and factory.
In an article entitled, "Safeguarding the Mothers of Tomor-
row," then-U.S. Secretary of Labor, James L. Davis, drew
a clear picture of this relationship, while he argued
that women have the right to earn a living, "at the same
time all will agree that women in industry would not exist
m an ideal social scheme. Women have a higher duty and
a higher sphere in life,
decades before.
it 6 6 As John Stuart Mill had argued
It does not follow that a woman should actually
support herself because she should be capabledoing sot in the natural course of events
she will not. 67
compete in
Though women might have an abstract right to
the marketplace, this right was undercut by her more concrete
primary responsibilities in the private sphere of the home.
Not only did her real responsibilities for domestic labor
Place her at a disadvantage, but the identification of
au women as mothers (or potential mothers, by the state
provided the justification for restricting women's access
to paid labor outside the home. The logic of protective
legislation was a result not of the fact that women's
"maternal function places her at a disadvantage in the
Struggle for subsistence" but that the state had a distinct
interest in making sure, insofar as it could, that women
-
1£llled thiS eternal function. It was not, therefore,
for womenls interest in health that protective legislation
was enacted but because of the state's interest in women
as mothers.
Opponents of protection fought legislation on the
simple grounds that women should be accorded the same liberal
rights as men. As one working woman expressed it,
The clamor for food and self-expression is
sharp and hurts. It should and must be satis-tied so long as it doen
' t interfere with the
rights of others
.... Don
' t suggest to me that thelaw is for our good which says it is better for
me to stay home and starve than to work after dark
.
68
While men were defined within the classical liberal tradition
as free individuals who ideally had the right to freedom
i-rom state interference in their work and family lives,
1 30
when's rights as free indivlduals^ ^ ^Pri"ary r0lS ^“ r
- AS ^~s, such as the working
woman guoted above, argued, women should bg ^
earn any income "so long as it doesn't • ty L t interfere with the
rights of others." But the hey to protective legislation
was precisely this: Working women did in essence
"interfere
wrth the rights of others" by subjecting themselves to
the "hazards" of work, precisely because the state had
a special interest in protecting motherhood. Women's ability
to reproduce therefore put her in a peculiar relationship
to the state. Women, from the point of view of the state
,
were not free individuals, but were mothers and as such
they were a resource, an asset, which the state intended
to preserve.
Women's potential for reproduction made her "physical
well-being" and "object of public interest." As then-Gover-
nor Smith (of New York) so aptly put it, "the future mothers
of this state are a resource that we should conserve."
And as Smith later added, "I can think of no greater asset
to the state than healthy women and children. The life
of the state is dependent upon them ." 69 Women's ability
to reproduce, tnerefore, was perceived as vital to the
state's interest and was explicitly tied to the general
welfare of the social and political order. As one member
of the Factory Investigating Commission had put it, "we
have got to preserve her a little better if we are going
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to have good future citizens " 70 M-n-xze . Women's role a <5 a ^j-ux s a repro-
~ Of Citi 2ens therefore undercut her own rights to
citizenshi p .
That the state viewed its relationship to women
differentiy than its relationship to men was made explicit
" thS U
' S
- SUPrSme C°Urt that finally upheld
a shorter day for working men. Bunting vs. Oregon «in 19,7,
As Anne Corinne Hill had argued, while the Muller decision
validated protective legislation for women on the grounds
that overworked women made poor mothers, the Bunting decision
rested on the grounds that overworked men made poor oiti-
While the Muller decision inspired a plethora of
legislation for women nationwide, the Bunting decision
went virtually ignored by state courts, no doubt because
male unions preferred organization to legislation in their
industries
.
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In any event, this ideological distinction
between male citizens and female mothers acted to reinforce
a sexual division of labor between men and women through
which men are associated with the public sphere and women
with the private sphere.
The antithesis between women's role as mother and
her status as a citizen was founded in the state's view
that the full and equal participation of women in the paid
labor force was a threat to women's role as "mother."
Given this logic, the increasingly visible movement of
women into the paid labor force was viewed by the state
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as a threat to both good mothering and bvy a, y extension, to
the genera! we! fare of society Constrained to some degree
y rhetoric of women's freedom to work, fearful of taking
esponsibility for throwing many women out of work, and
also aware of both pressure from industrialists for the
need for women's cheap labor, as well as the need of the
working class families for women's wages, the state could
not simply enact laws which excluded women entirely from
industrial work. instead, laws were designed to reinforce
work patterns that were perceived as consonant with women's
role as "mother:" As women moved farther away from the
home, the heavier the state's hand would be in regulation.
This pattern becomes especially clear when we contrast
State policy regarding women working outside the home to
state policy on homeworkers.
In homework, where women’s paid labor was viewed
as entirely consistent with her duties as mother and wife,
the state would decree that it lacked the legitimate police
powers to interfere in the "private" activities of women
working at home. In laundry work, for instance, women
working outside the home were subject to both hour laws
and night work laws. But the law specifically stated that
it was not to apply to women doing laundry at home "for
family trade." Women in the garment industry or working
in feather and flower-making factories were subject to
regulation, while their homeworking sisters were not.
As already discussed, such exemptionsp always served to
undercut protective deviation by al lo„ing women who worked
" faCt0rlSS t0 brlnS h°- at the end of the day and
continue working after ipdoi u9 legal nours. The logic of protective
legislation was more attuned tno where women worked than
to how Iona they worked. Once in the home
, where they
presumably belonged, they would be free from regulation.
Indeed, from the point of view of the ultimate effect of
protective legislation-the reinforcement of women's primary
association with home life--regUlati nn ofmu o 01 women working
at home was not necessary.
The interrelationship of the public and private
worlds comes to the fore in the study of protective legisla-
tion for women. And this is precisely what both advocates
and opponents of legislation failed to see. The choice
really was not between "protection" on the one hand and
"equality" on the other, but a question of the relationship
between women’s private position in the home and her public
position in the workforce. Reformers failed to see the
interdependence between these two spheres and hence tried
to argue for women's primary identification as mothers
at the same time they demanded improved conditions for
her outside the home. In particular, arguments from such
powerful social reformers as Florence Kelley and Josephine
Goldmark were based on assumptions about women that grew
directly out of her association with home life. As Alice
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Kessler-Harris points out, reformers held that the attributes
women developed in the home,
"compassion, nurturance, a
better-developed sense of morality-unfitted her for com-
petitive economic struggle ." 72 Such arguments are rerain
iscent of Mill's conceptualization of the distinct! tn a & ly feminine
characteristics women developed in private life and provided
powerful fodder for arguments justifying women's protection
outside the home. But though Mill questioned the "natural-
foundation of these feminine characteristics when he argued
that they were the result only of women's confinement to
the^home, progressive era reformers went to great lengths
to "scientifically" prove the natural foundation of these
qualities. m a very real sense, women's position as mothers
did place her at a disadvantage in the labor market. As
discussed in chapter two, the very structure of the labor
market was designed to accommodate only single workers
witout childcare responsibilities. But to base this disad-
vantage in nature and not social convention was to rein-
force and broaden existing inequities by further limiting
the options of women for work and to reify as natural social-
ly constructed sexual inequality.
In most accounts of protective legislation, the
state "disappears" into the background and attention is
drawn to the social organizations, the unions, the bosses,
and the social reformers who pushed through legislation.
While state policy certainly didn't develop in isolation
from the pressure of these competing interests, it would
distortion to view the state as simply a neutral
mediator, served only with the task of mediating conflict
and finding a satisfactory compromise for all. As we have
seen in this chapter, the state had its m distinct interest
ln thS re9Ulati°" of women 1 s labor, one thafc was ^ ^
rectly to the maintenance of a particular kind of patri-
archal social order. The "protection" of women was founded,
first, in the definition of all women as "mothers" and,
second, in the assumption that women's full-time employment
outside the home threatened dominant definitions of "mother-
hood." While many progressive social reformers failed
to see the connections between women's standing in the
private world of the home and her position in the public
world of politics and work, state policy-makers explicitly
drew connections between these two spheres. At least,
potentially, they understood that the entrance of women
into the public" industrial workforce threatened to disrupt
the "natural" order of things in "private" family life.
The state's interest in motherhood, as it is reflected
in protective legislation, was based on a more fundamental
interest in maintaining "proper" patriarchal relations
in the private sphere of the home. In the end, protective
legislation for women only would translate into a reas-
sertion of women's primary identification with the private
sphere of the family, an identification that would preclude
her full and equal participation in either
Of politics or the public world of work.
the public
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world
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION: DEVELOPING A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE
Scholars of every persuasion have documented the
expansion of the liberal state since the turn of the century.
Whether condemning or applauding this development, the
Central questions to which all analysts of the liberal
state address themselves is this* fnr wi-,La , to what purpose and
in whose interest does the state serve? The answers offered
to this question are as varied as the political perspec-
tives they represent. In this chapter I win extend this
question to the issue of gender relations. More specifically,
what role has the state played in relation to women's
inequality? And to what extent and in what ways, if any,
has state policy reinforced women's primary role as mother
and secondary position in the market place?
Before going on to offer my specific analysis,
which will contribute to the development of a feminist
theory of the state, it is first important to review the
oasic perspectives offered by the major theories of the
state and political power. While this is not intended
to be an exhaustive review of the literature, I hope to
outline some major questions and issues which will serve
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as guide-posts for my own analysis. m the first section
of this chapter I wall review a representative composite
Of welfare liberal views of the state before moving on
to an assessment of the major critics of this view. My
purpose will be to judge the insights each perspective
can offer when applied to my historical research. In con-
clusion, I will develop my own perspective and address
some of the more fundamental questions left unanswered
in previous chapters.
The Growth of Welfare Liberalism,
Prior to the rise of welfare liberalism, the clas-
sical liberalism of eighteenth and nineteenth century society
posited a sharp distinction between political and economic
activities and argued for a distinctly laissez-faire view
of the state. Agruing that the economic system was ruled
by a set of natural and immutable laws, economists such
as Adam Smith concluded that state power to regulate eco-
nomic activity should be strictly limited. Left to itself,
they argued, both the economy and society as a whole were
self
-regulating. Equilibrium (though not economic equality)
would prevail only if all artificial political constraints
on economic relations were removed. Left to themselves,
the citizens of the polity could negotiate and contract
ireely over the means of their subsistence.
Concurrent with this division between the state
and the economy came a closely related set of princioles
Which would, ostensibly, rule the services and functions
performed by the state. In the laissez-faire view of things
the state was to be decidely
"dis-interested" in the affairs
of its citizens. As I have discussed in chapter one, the
ends of political life were decisive! v ily lowered with the
development of classical liberalism. No longer would the
State promote the ethical and moral precepts which it em-
bodied in previous eras. Instead, the state would be trans-
formed from "an ethical association for the attainment
Of virtue" to an "instrumental relation" designed only
to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens
.
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Toward this end, the state would be limited in its positive
action to the protection of society from the invasion of
other independent nations, and the protection of individual
citizens from the interference of others through a strictly
defined legal system.
Central to this view was the assumption of the
state's neutrality. Classical liberal thinkers posited
the state as "above" the conflicts of society, and offered
an ideal of the state as free from the influence of priv-
ileged groups or classes in society. Laws would be enacted
which protected the fundamental rights of citizens and
each citizen would be judged equally under the law.
Though there are few who would argue that the state
achieved in practice what the laissez-faire view preached,
by the turn of the twentieth century it was clear to ,„any
groups that the classical literal view was inadequate
The development of large-scale corporations, the erosion
Of a familial-based patriarchy, class struggle and massive
igration all forced to the surface renewed debates over
the proper role of the state in society. Corporate elites
pressured the state towards more positive action in order
to stabilize the marketplace; social reformers and labor
organizations demanded that the state take action to ameli-
orate the worst effects of industrialization; and the growth
not only of the Progressive movement but of the Socialist
Party and the International Workers of the World threatened
to radicalize party politics.
The impetus behind the expansion of the state at
the turn of the century was rooted not only in an increasing
ly volatile class conflict, but also in a growing concern
over the stability of family relations. Progressive era
reformers brought family issues to the center of reform
politics and spread the fear of the breakdown of "tradi-
tional” American family forms. In addition, the immigration
of (particularly) southern European immigrants to the United
States and the internal migration of blacks roused nativist
fears of "race suicide ." 2 In the face of all of these
pressures, the state, with the aid of political theoreti-
cians v/ith pens ready, took positive steps to reinforce
and reconstruct the class and gender order.
One of the best known and influential thinkers
Progressive era, Herbert Croly, laid out most clearly
the principles underlying what would become generally ac-
cepted as welfare liberalism. What Croly provided was
a view that synthesized the need for state social and
economic regulation with an acceptance of both the new
corporate economy and of a distinctly liberal commitment
to democratic values.
in his influential work. The Promise of American
Life ( 1 909), Croly begins by asserting some of the basic
principles of classical liberalism and then going on to
modify them. Ideally, political privileges are to be
abolished through the democratic system: "If any citizen
or any group of citizens enjoys by virtue of the law any
advantage over their fellow-citizens, then the most sacred
principle of democracy is violated." 4 While advocating
political equality, Croly is quick to point out that he
is not advocating economic or social equality: "Such an
organization may permit radical differences among individuals
in the opportunities and possessions they actually enjoy;
but no man would be able to impute his own success or failure
to the legal framework of society." 13 They key to demo-
cratic political rights was found, therefore, in the neu-
trality of the law and the state. The restriction of state
power to providing only the basic political rules of the
game was essential to the idea of equal opportunity. In
purpose of
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i S S Q Z f cl 1 3TG l"PrmQ 4- 1— _terms, the government was strictly
limited: "The power to leaisla^
-i tc gislate implies the power to
discriminate; and the best way consequently for a good
democracy of equal rights to avoid the danger of discrim-
ination will be to organize the state so that its power
for ill win be rigidly restricted, "6 According fco fche
Classical liberal model, therefore, government must be
made "feeble and devoid of independence."
But Croly perceived that the growing class conflict
in the United States required more than this. Working
Class dissent over the accumulation of wealth and the power
maior corporations had gained over the federal government
led Croly to assert a new role for the state. As Croly
argued, "The national public interest has to be affirmed
by positive and aggressive action. The nation has to
have a will and a policy as well as the individual; and
this policy can no longer be confined to the merely negative
task of keeping individual rights from becoming in any
way privileged." 7 Perceiving that the practice of state
non-interference is "just as selective in its effects as
the practice of state interference" Croly argued for the
development of a balance in government between "selection
by non-interference" and "active selection." In a time
when economic opportunities were shrinking for the great
mass of people, the state would have to actively insure
its own survival through the assurance that equal opportunity
W3. S Still Qf foctiv^ mu Q -» , ,te e. The solution was for the state to
offer more "positive services" in order to maintain the
"loyalty of the economically less independent class ." 8
in this way the state could strike a balance between in-
dividual political liberty, the maintenance of a modified
tree market capitalism, and the democratic distribution
of political, if riot economic, power.
central to the welfare liberal view was the presu rai
tion that the state would take on a new relationship to
the conflicts of society, while the classical view ideally
Placed the state "above" the conflicts of groups and indi-
viduals in the civil order, welfare liberals placed the
state at the heart of such conflicts. But instead of pro-
moting a more broadly defined social interest, the state
was to play the role of neutral mediator. Emptied of its
moral associations and consigned with the task of the most
basic protection of individual rights, the state would
oversee the negotiations of conflicts between individual
citizens or groups of citizens. In its presumably neutral
umpire status the state would enforce the basic rules of
the game and provide the arena through which social com-
petitors could meet, negotiate, and find compromise.
Essential to the growth of the state was a con-
tinuing redefinition of those activities rightfully viewed
as subject for state regulation. In other words, the
expansion of the state required an expansion of the
In a cam-
definition of the boundaries of "public life."
paign speech of 1912, Woodrow Wilson explicitly brought
this issue to the foreground. Arguing that "America is
not now, and cannot in the future be, a place for unrestrict-
ed individual enterprise" Wilson proposed a redefinition
Of the proper spheres of state power. 9
Wilson begins by pointing to the transformation
Of housing in urban areas that has resulted from industri-
alization and immigration. In the past "every family had
its own little premises, [and] everv famii,,' l u j .. . y l ily was separated
in its life from every other family." 10 But now families
are "piled layer upon layer" in the tenement districts.
Changing circumstances thus require new responsibilities
for the state. In Glasgow, he argues "they have made up
their minds that the entries and the hallways of great
tenements are public streets" and the state now has the
responsibility of protecting citizens there. As Wilson
stated it, "These are the highways of human movement, and
wherever light is needed, wherever order is needed, there
we will carry the authority of the city." 11 He then goes
on to draw an analogy between this example and that of
the state's regulation of the Steel Corporation. The Steel
Corporation, he argues, is "just as much a public business
as a great tenement house is a public highway" and "there-
j-ore, whenever bodies of men employ bodies of men, it ceases
to be a private relationship." 12 The state, therefore,
has the responsibility to actY as foster father" in order
to safeguard the lives of its citizens.
But from the liberal point of view the question
remained as to how increased state power could remain
compatible with an older ideal of political power as demo-
cratically decentralized. if the state was to act, the
question remained, in whose or what interests would it
do so? In short, how would the positive state remain
accountable to the interests of all citizens? m terms
the welfare liberal paradigm, the pluralist model of
the distribution of political power would supply the answer.
Thus in order to continue the discussion, it is now necessary
to look more critically at the pluralist definition of
political power and the major criticisms of this perspective.
In addition, I will begin to apply this more theoretical
work to the historical case studies I have laid out in
previous chapters.
lheories of Policital Power
—
Pluralism
As the early twentieth century economy increasingly
came to be seen as lacking self-regulation
,
an evolving
pluralist ideology of a self-regulating political market
developed, one that was offered as a substitute for the
failing economic market. Of this competitive political
market, Bentley wrote, "when we have a group that partici-
pates in the political system we always have another group
From this
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facing it in the same plane." 1 3
,„ point Qf^the state did not express an independent interest of its'
own, and neither discriminated in favor of nor against
any particular position in the political marketplace of
Weas. Rather, its responsibilities remained contained
to the insurance that all significant interests gained
a fair hearing in the decision-making arena.
The underlying definition of political power which
informed this pluralist perspective defined power as simply
"the capacity of "A" to get "B" to do something he other-
wise would not do ." 14 Power relations, therefore, are
most explicit in cases where overt conflict exists between
identifiable individuals or groups of individuals and where
a particular decision on a given issue is at stake. Extend-
ing this model to an understanding of state politics, legis-
lators are lobbied and influenced by a variety of actors
and pass laws which are perceived to be in (at least the
compromised) interests of all those concerned with a given
issue. From this point of view, no one individual or group
(except perhaps those on the very fringe of an issue) are
entirely excluded from the political process. As the ability
to influence the legislative process is available to all
citizens, power is assumed to be widely distributed through-
out the social order through this democratic process of
competition, negotiation and compromise.
From the pluralist-liberal point of view, the strug-
gle over protective labor legislation in New York would
stand as evidence of the democratic distribution of political
Power. A variety of distinct interest groups pushed for
their own interests and formed alliances with other groups
who shared their policy preferences: Organized women workers
fought for shorter hours and better working conditions;
manufacturers opposed the restriction of their ability
to freely trade with labor, male or female; organized male
workers sought protection from the competition of women
workers; and social reformers pressured the state to protect
motherhood and what they saw as a disintegrating family life.
Through the democratic pluralist system, each group has
an opportunity to express such preferences. Legislators
who are responsive to such groups enact laws which best
serve the compromised interest of all-enacting protective
legislation for some women workers, exemptions for others,
and leaving the door open for future amendment of the law.
Those groups viewed as on the fringe of a political issue,
such as the National Woman's Party, would be unable to
generate enough popular support (from other women's groups,
for instance) and would lose on that particular issue.
In the case of homework, the state would also develop
policy in response to pressures from a variety of groups
and take the middle ground of indirect and limited regulation
of homev/ork through the licensing system. Through the
licensing system the state could address the concerns of
the National Consumer's League over the spread of disease,
and the concerns of the National Child Labor Committee
over the use of child labor by homeworkers. And through
the licensing system the state could strike a balance be-
tween manufacturers' demands for no regulation and the
demands of organized labor for the abolition of homework.
In both cases, the state would play no active role in the
formation of policy but would be a "dependent variable"
of the combined interests of all those parties concerned
with both protective labor legislation and the regulation
of homework.
While the pluralist model might help to explain
part of the process by which legitimized and well-organized
interests gained access to the decision-making process,
it would be inadequate to address the question of how and
why certain issues and groups are excluded from this process
Recent reforms of this pluralist model can go some distance
in addressing this question.
Theories of Political Power-
Reformism
Ihe pluralist model has come under attack from
a number of different directions. Authors such as Schatt-
schneider and Bacnracn and Baratz, addressing themselves
to more contemporary problems, but gleaning insights which
are at least as applicable to my study, have pointed to
what they caU the "bias of the system." Political powef
- exercised, Schattschneider argues
, not only through
the overt conrlict or interests represented by the liberal
definition, but by excluding certain groups or issues from
the political process entirely,
in'favour ol Selxploi^if 2^ 011 haVe a bi-
conflict and the suppression ofothers^Sec
° f
organization is the mobilization ' ^issues are organized into oolitic? whi ®°meare organized out. 15 L 1 ^ e others
Bachrach and Baratz shifted the focus of analysis
onto what they terra the "second face of power." 16 Rather
than focussing exclusively on those specific issues which
were addressed through the formal political process, they
argued that it was equally important to critically analyze
the "nondecision-making process." Not only was it importan
then to look at who wins and who loses on the political
battleground, but it was essential to understand which
groups and what kinds of issues and concerns were excluded,
suffocated, or derailed before gaining entrance to the
decision-making arena.
In sum, what I will refer to as the "reformist"
model, argues that power is exercised not only in the
strictly behaviorist sense of directly observable decisions
and their effects, but also when the holders of power prevent
an issue from entering the public arena. As Bachrach and
Baratz state, "to the extent that a person or group--con-
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sciously or unconsciously-
-creates or reinforces barriers
to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or
group has power ." 17
Clearly, the insights offered by the reformist
model speak to the history of the state's regulation of
women's labor, and to questions about the limits to the
ways in which working women could influence the nature
of that regulation. Host obviously, women's lack of the
vote and her formal status as a ward of the state certainly
undercut the potential impact women could have on the
development of legislation. But as we have seen, women's
disenfranchised status didn't entirely exclude women from
the law-making process. Through strong organizations women
could and did have some impact on the decision-making process.
But the question remains as to which organizations and
what kinds of issues were allowed entrance into this process.
Certainly, a vast number of women who had a stake in pro-
tective legislation, for instance, had little access to
the public arena of debate. Unorganized women workers,
those in the ghettoized female sectors of the economy such
as domestics, occupations which employed predominantly
non-white women, and women in non-traditional "male" occu-
pations had little to say, even though some of these women
had the most to lose with the enactment of restrictive
and prohibitive laws. As we have seen few of these women
(such as the women foundry workers ) were even called before
the Factory Investigating Commission in New York or the
legislature to give testimony.
in addition, the position offered by the National
Woman's Party-that protective legislation should apply
equally to male workers-was never given serious consid-
eration in the formal political process. Members of the
National Woman's Party were never called before the F.I.c.
to present their position, and so were denied the formal
routes of entry into political debate.
Groups which did gain direct access, such as the
Women's Trade Union League in alliance with other organ-
izations in the Women's Joint Legislative Conference were
also limited in the kinds of proposals they could make.
For instance, after attempting to introduce minimum wage
and health insurance measures, they were subject to the
red-baiting tactics of conservative legislators in alliance
with staunchly "free market" manufacturers. Such tactics
could and did serve to undercut proposals that went beyond
the established grounds for debate. Proposals which sought
to extend protection to both sexes, or sought to raise
the income-earning power of women, therefore, were explicitly
excluded from formal consideration.
In addition, it is also important to point out
that manufacturers who advocated the abolition of all laws
restricting women's labor were given limited hearing.
Changing attitudes towards the state's responsibility for
IOr thS heaUh and Safety ° f“ workers and, acre fun-
damentally, State regulation of potential class conflict,
left little room for arguments in favor of a more tradi-'
tional laissez-faire stance by the state a •y Ln . Again, as Woodrow
Wilson had expressed in, America was no longer a place
for 'unrestricted individual enterprise." what is important
for us to question is the nature and extent of state restric-
tions, not only in terms of regulating capital, but in
terms of regulating women's labor. The case of homework
can help to draw this question to the foreground.
As we have seen in chapter two, homeworkers them-
selves were never called upon to express opinions about
the regulation or conditions of their work, and no organ-
ization existed which expressed the interests and concerns
of these working immigrant mothers. Questions and issues
that might have served in the interests of these women,
who needed to both care for children and earn a living
wage, therefore, were never adequately addressed, either
through formal or informal routes. In addition, most home-
workers were recent immigrants and confronted language
barriers to the expression of their interests through a
political system unfamiliar to them. Since both labor
and reform organizations advocated the abolition of homework,
and attempted to rescind the homework licenses of families
who were found to employ their children or contain members
v/ith infectious diseases, most homeworkers tended to avoid
all contact with such organizations. But clearly the
problems involved in the development of homework legisla-
tion transcend the question of homeworkers' participation
an the formal political system. And this question can
lead us to examine some of the fundamental inadequacies
of the reformist model of political power relations, it
is not just that homeworkers lacked the organization to
express their interests as a class, but that the terms
Of the debate were such that the issues they were concerned
with were excluded from debate.
Beyond the important corrective the reformist
perspective offers to the pluralist model of power relations,
it remains commited to a view of political power relations
that stresses overt conflict between articulated interests.
Even though the reformist corrective can expand our view
to include those issues and interest excluded from the
political process, it focusses too exclusively on those
interest, both inside and outside the political arena,
which are already fully articulated. As Bachrach and
Baratz state, the critical investigator
must determine if those persons and groups
apparently disfavored by the mobilization
Oj. bias nave grievances, overt or covert ... overt
grievances are those that have already been ex-
pressed and have generated an issue within the
political system, whereas covert ones are still
outside the system. ^
8
Although Bachrach and Baratz focus attention on potential
issues instead of those which are already explicitly repre-
sented in the decision-making process, their emphasis still
lies on those grievances which are articulated, whether
inside or outside of the formal political system. The
exercise of decision-making and nondecision-making power,
therefore, is only identifiable when conflict, either overt
or covert, exists over articulated interests. when no
such conflict exists, consensus must be assumed.
Bachrach and Baratz's modification of, ye t funda-
mental ties to the pluralist model leaves them with an
approach which is inadequate to account for the ways in
Which power can be used to prevent the very articulation
of interests which run counter to the status quo. Part
or this problem lies in their narrow definition of interests
and grievances. As Steven Lukes has argued:
Jhen
S
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that if men feel no grievances,t hey have no interests that are harmed by thePower
. But this is highly unsatisfactory,the first place, what, in any case is a grievance--an articulated demand, based on political knowledge,an undirected complaint arising out of everyday
experience, a vague feeling of unease or sense ofdeprivation? 1
y
In short, the reformist model cannot account for the more
subtle ways in which power is exercised.
Lukes offers a radical critique of the reformist
position--one which attempts to clarify the ways in which
challenges to the structure of power in society are thwarted.
First, he argues that the most insidious exercise of power
is rooted in the ability of powerholders
to prevent people, to whatever deqree fromhaving grievances by shapina fhP ir '
cognitions and preferences ? n J l Perceptions,they accept their ro^ ^n the existing7^
no'alternati^e^rir or^
^ 806 ^9^°'
natural and unchangeable
, ^rbecaus^the
6
rt as divinely ordained ^nd bene?icL^^
What one must focus on, therefore, is not just overt or
covert conflicts of interest, but latent conflict between
the interests of those who hold power and what Lukes calls
the "real interests" of those excluded from power-holding
positions. Lukes thereby defines power as the ability
of "A to affect B in a manner contrary to B's interests." 2
'
While pluralists define "interests" in terms of explicit
policy preferences or wants, and the reformist model graft:
onto this definition those wants or preferences "deflected,
submerged or concealed," Lukes offers a definition which
includes that which one would want or prefer if able to
make a choice. The restriction of choice, either by ex-
cluding certain individuals or groups from the political
process altogether, or the systematic or organizational
limitation of the kinds of issues which are allowed entry
into public politics, or the limitation of the expression
of interests in more subtle ideological ways would all
constitute, for Lukes, the exercise of power. Some of
the problems raised by Lukes' insight will be developed
by me in my concluding section. First, it is important
to develop the rest of Lukes' critique.
Lukes also argues that the reformist model is too
individualistic to account For- nf r the more fundamental ways
in which the "mobilization of bias" on -Fu it, enforced. While
the reformist model can address the ways in which individual
decision-makers, either consciously or not, limit the access
Of Challengers of the status guo to the decision-mating
arena, it cannot adequately address the "socially struc-
tured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and
practices of institutions, which may indeed be manifested
by individuals' inaction ." 22
An analysis, therefore, of the individual or groups
involved in the development of protective labor legislation
or homework regulation, or even an analysis which considered
those groups excluded from formal political debate, would
remain inadequate. Rather, one needs to question the broader
social limits within which debate took place. For instance,
viewing the struggle over protective labor legislation
for women only as a struggle between "protection" on the
one hand and "equality" on the other would be insufficient.
Rather (as I have argued in chapter three) it is necessary
L° understand this debate in the context of both a sexually
segregated marketplace and the ideological identification
of all women as potential mothers. And in the case of
homework, it would be important to understand not only
the state's reluctance to interfere in the private lives
of nomeworkers
,
but to analyze the fundamental commitment
0. power-holders to , pertiouler i»,„l„„ both bo.e
“ U<* "* l “* teooynition o,
.„u„,
mothers as legitimate wage-earners.
Recent works by marxist theorists have offered
critiques of the pluralist model along the same lines.
Political power relations can not be understood, they argue,
in isolation from the broader economic and socral constants
Which shape and limit power relations in the formal polit-
ical arena. As we shall see in the following section,
such an approach can shed some light on-and create new
problems for—an understanding of women's labor policy.
theories of Political Power
Marxist Perspectives
In sharp contrast to both the pluralist and reformist
perspectives, most marxist analysts view power as concen-
trated at the top of a highly stratified social order.
The state, rather than serving the interests of all citi-
zens, or playing the neutral role of umpire, plays an active
and necessary role in maintaining this highly stratified
order by resolving the social, political, and economic
comlicts inherent in a society built upon fundamental
inequalities. While most marxists view state policy as
a reflection of the interests of those at the top of the
class order, marxists differ widely over the process by
which economic privilege is translated into political power.
In this section I will highlight the insights and limitations
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of the instrumentalist and structuralist marxist views
Of the state and draw out the implications of both for
a feminist theory of the state.
The orthodox marxist view of the state characterizes
state policy as "an instrument in the hands of the ruling
class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the
Class structure itself .
"
22
In its crudest ^
instrumental view points to the class background of key
executive, legislative, and administrative leaders, as
well as to those elite organizations which are viewed as
influential in the design and implementation of state
policy. In particular, emphasis is laid on the ability
or economic elites to set the broad limits to political
debates through the influence of policy research groups
and the constant exchange of personnel between the top
of the political and economic orders. From this point
of view, control at the top is solidified well enough to
thwart challenges from those excluded from political and
economic power. Weinstein's study 24 of the National Civic
Federation m transforming, coopting and incorporating
working class demands during the Progressive Era stands
as one example of this instrumentalist perspective.
io bring the discussion back to my own analysis,
what might an analogous instrumental feminist theory of
the state look like, and what might be the problems with
such an analysis? Undoubtedly, such a perspective would
argue
focus attention on the gender of those in power and
that state policies which reinforce sexual inequality are
result. Or the act that those in power are male, state
policy, therefore, represents the direct translation of
the interests of those males in power.
While no feminist analysis would argue the irrele-
vancy of the fact that almost all powerful political leaders
in the U.S. have been male, this perspective would still
leave many questions unanswered. First, such a perspective
would necessarily view the solution in terms of changing
the gender of those in power. But as Margaret Thatcher
and Jeane Kirkpatrick can attest to, femaleness often has
nothing to do with feminism. An instrumentalist approach
would be poorly prepared to address this problem, primarily
because such an approach fails to adequately account for
the role of ideology and the pressures of broader systemic
limits to the development of state policy (both of which
I will address shortly.
)
Second, an instrumentalist feminist perspective
v/ould undoubtedly define the "patriarchal class" as "all
males" without regard to the question of the different
interests economic class or racial divisions internal to
this class might entail. Political struggles over protective
labor legislation can bring this problem into focus: while
it was in the interests of unionized male workers to have
women protected right out of their jobs," male manufacturers
women
sought to eliminate all forms of protection for
workers so that they might better exploit both female and
male workers. This division, I would argue, was not simply
a reflection of the underlying class conflict between male
workers and male bosses, but reflects a division based
on the patriarchal interests of both. One could tentatively
suggest (though this is an issue worthy of another disser-
tation) that the struggle over this issue represents a
larger struggle over the transformation of patriarchy from
a familially-based to a more socially-based form: while
male workers preferred to see women remain at home and
completely outside of the workforce, manufacturers wanted
to be able to exploit women's labor in a way they could
only do m a patriarchal society, where women's labor is
systematically undervalued. Here we can see how class
and gender interests converged to form the foundations
of a political battle which reflected the different inter-
ests of working class and upper class males.
Subject to pressure from both of these fronts,
the state found the solution in the enactment of legis-
lation which allowed women into the marketplace, but which
reinforced a sexually segregated labor market. Women's
labor could be exploited, but only if it did not fundamen-
tally interfere with her primary responsibilities in the
home, place her in direct competition with male workers,
or encourage women to enter more highly-paid occupations.
sIt is clear, then, that at least in this
legitimacy rested on the accommodation of
though not irreconcilable tendencies of a
case, the state'
two conflicting,
patriarchal social
system.
More sophisticated marxist analyses have offered
critiques of the instrumentalist view, which would be equally
applicable to the feminist version I've just laid out.
Marxists have argued that the instrumentalist approach
is too individualistic and behaviouralist, and in this
sense shares many of the problems of its pluralist target.
By focussing attention on the conscious and intentional
rule of individual power-holders, this perspective fails
to consider the role of ideology in power relations as
well as as the structural constraints on the state which
transcend the intentional will of individual decision-makers.
First, it has been argued that divisions internal
to the ruling class preclude the state's direct control
by one sector of that class
.
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Any understanding of state
policy, therefore, would have to be set within the broader
context of the state s responsibility for the more general
reproduction of social order and the maintenance of the
fundamental requirements of the class system. As Fred
Block has statea, instrumentalism fails to recognize that
to act in the general interest of capital, the state must
be able to take actions against the particular interests
of capitalists ." 25 The state's responsibility for systemic
stability, therefore, meant that it must play a "relatively
autonomous" role in the construction of long-term social
order. And managers of the state would continue to develop
policy in the interests of the capitalist class not neces-
sarily out of an explicit class consciousness (as the instru-
mentalist view posits) but because the power of political
elites was systematically dependent upon the continuing
maintenance of the economic order. The pursuit of state
policy in the interest of capital is dependent not only
upon the class consciousness of individual power-holders,
out also on the structural requirements of the capitalist
system, which ties the legitimacy of the state, for instance,
to the tax revenues available only in a "healthy” economy.
Second, marxist critics have argued that the func-
tions the state performs are not just economic, but are
ideological. Specifically, though the state might act
in tne interests of those at the top of the economic order,
it must at least appear to be democratically influenced
by and concerned with those excluded from power in order
to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of most citizens.
In order to clarify both the structural pressures on the
state and also address some of the problems raised by a
deterministic view of ideology it is necessary to briefly
review the structuralist variant of marxist theory.
Structuralist marxist theorists have taken a position
at the opposite end of the spectrum from instrumentalism
and have argued that the state is systematically limited
by the needs, constraints and contradictions inherent in
capitalist accumulation. The primary function of the state,
therefore, is to attempt to ameliorate the conflicts created
by these. In contrast to instrumentalism, state policy
is determined by the structural constraints of the capitalist
social order rather than simply by the control or partici-
pation of economic elites over the state.
According to the structuralist perspective, the
maintenance of an economic infrastructure (such as trans-
portation and research and development), expenditures for
military protection for capital expansion overseas, and
the expense of supporting, through welfare programs, the
casualties of a capitalist economy would all constitute
structural requirements that set limits to state policy
regardless of who is at the helm of the state. Indeed,
from the structuralist point of view, participation by
ruling elites in the political system is neither necessary
nor desirable. As Poulantzas states, "it can be said that
the capitalist state best serves the interests of the
capitalist class only when members of this class do not
participate directly in the state apparatus ...." 28
While the structuralist perspective is suggestive,
its fatal flaw lies in the fact that in overstating the
case it leaves us with a perspective that is devoid of
human agency. As Miliband has stated in response to
Poulantzas
,
What his exclusive stre^o on "Au , .
tions” suggests is thlt f,hat t^sYcY* 1*'in every particular and at all timeYho?? S 13determined by these "objective relations"!7 •otner words, that the structural cons?~d nf " rthe system are so absolutely compelling =2 Yturn those who run the state into the merest f,lnAt iondriss 3,nd GXGcut'd nt- q ^ i-u c
them by "the system". 29° ‘
icies imposed upon
From the structuralist point of view, therefore, relations
Of domination are relatively "fixed." state policy reflect,
the systemic needs of the capitalist order, while the
state's legitimacy is maintained through a mystifying
ideology which paints the illusion that the state serves
in the interests of all citizens, the ideology of liberal
pluralism. In the end, the allegiance of those at the
bottom of the social system is maintained only through
the mystification of the state's true functions. Even
though the state must play a relatively autonomous role
in order to perform its functions adequately, it remains
in the last instance captive of the interests of the ruling
class
.
The problem with this perspective is that it is
built upon a concept of dominant ideology that both lacks
a sense of human agency and eliminates any concept of social
struggle. From the point of view of instrumentalism, only
those at the top have human agency, that is, have the
ability to effect social change; from the structuralist
point of view, even those at the top are devoid of agency,
Of an ability to translate will into action, since their
actions are in large part determined by "the system."
m neither account is the ability to challenge the structure
of power given legitimate consideration. Working class
interests, or from a feminist point of view, the true
interests of women are rarely given consideration through
the formal political system, and policy which appears to
be in their interests in reality only serves to reinforce
structural inequalities.
Such a perspective has led to a reinterpretation
of state policies which on the surface appear to serve
the interests of dominated classes. Welfare policy, for
instance, has been viewed not only as the result of a human-
itarian impulse on the part of the state or as the result
of demands from the poor, but as a tool of social control
aimed at quelling working class dissent. When taken to
an extreme, the interpretation of all state policy from
the point of view of dominant classes can lead to some
PrettY unusual political judgements.
If we accept that welfare is controlled by
capital and acts against the welfare of working
people, then why should we fight the cuts? We
should welcome them... as a direct cut in the
power of the ruling class over the working class
.
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Analogously, are we to assume that protective legis-
lation was the result only of the needs of a patriarchal
social order? And if so, how are we to explain the strength
and longevity of tne support of women's organizations for
protective labor legislation? Or the preference, however
qualified, of homeworkers to remain at home? Clearly,
we need a more complex approach here, and one that does
not rely exclusively on a definition of ideology as false
consciousness, or explain the support of women for legis-
lation in terms of their being "dupes" of those in power.
Still, some variation of a structuralist feminist
analysis has strengths which the individualistic approaches
of pluralism, reformism and instrumentalism do not. In
my concluding section I will draw some of these out, together
With the idea that any feminist theory of the state that
can do justice to women's history must employ a concept
of social struggle.
Summary and Conclusion
Though the pluralist model can shed some light
on the process by which well-organized interest groups
parlay for influence within the formal decision-making
arena, the pluralist model is inadequate to account for
the ways in which gender inequality both informs and is
reproduced by the state. First, the pluralist perspective
assumes both the neutrality of the state and the political
equality of all citizens. Each citizen, it is presumed,
has ample opportunity to express his or her interest, to
influence the construction of state policy, and each citizen
is treated equally under the law. Crucial to the assumption
Of the state's neutrality and of a generalized political
equality is a second fundamental assumption rooted in plural-
ist theory: the neutrality of the state is built upon a
presumed disjuncture between political and economic power.
From this point of view, both class and gender
inequality are viewed as ideally irrelevant to political
power. For instance, while economic power may be relatively
concentrated, political power remains relatively decentral-
ised and dispersed throughout the polity. Indeed, pluralists
argue that the best insurance against a class-based politics
is through the establishment of a representative and polit-
ically democratic order, where the state serves in the
interests of all citizens.
While the reformist model can broaden our perspective
to include an understanding of the ways in which certain
issues, groups and interests are excluded from formal
political consideration, it remains committed to some of
the same fundamental assumptions proposed by pluralism.
In other words, the reformist model offers a corrective,
but not a fundamental critique of pluralism. The reformist
model, therefore, points to the ways in which the political
process has failed to live up to its ideal, without question-
ing the veracity of that ideal.
Marxist analyses have offered a more fundamental
critique of the liberal assumptions upon which pluralism
is built. By challenging the liberal disjuncture between
political and economic power, marxist scholars have argued
that the structure of political power is a reflection of
more basic class relations, whether through the direct
control of economic elites or through more subtle systemic
pressures, marxists have argued that the state represents
not the interests of all citizens, but the interests of
those at the top of the economic order. From this point
Of view, pluralism operates as a (false) ideological mask
over the class basis of state policy. m other words,
the division between political and economic power is illusory
and that illusion is maintained at least in part by the
promulgation of pluralist ideology.
By focussing attention on the interconnections
between economic power and the structure and nature of
state power, the marxist perspective can begin to provide
the kind of framework of analysis more appropriate to an
understanding of the state's relationship to gender inequal-
ity. Yet still, this perspective is inadequate. While
the pluralist perspective presupposes a rather indulgent
view of the distribution of political power and popular
control over the formation of state policy, most marxist
perspectives tend to view power as both concentrated and
unified at the top of the political order. I will argue
that what is needed is a perspective that can view the
development of state policy as a product of historically
specific social struggles. In addition, I will argue that
the state is limited by an underlying committment to a
broadly defined patriarchal social system in much the same
way as marxists have argued it is limited by the broad
requirements of capitalist class relations. Put simply,
thS f °ll0Win9 secti°" I will confront the question of
What it means to say that the state is patriarchal.
In contrast to the perspectives offered so far,
I would argue that the state operates as an arena for the
resolution of conflicts created by the needs of both capital-
ism and patriarchy. This is not to argue that the state
is a neutral mediator of conflict, nor is the state consti-
tuted by a simple reflection of the needs and interests
of those at the top of the stratified social order. Rather
I would argue, the purpose of the state is to resolve
conflict within the broad confines of its commitment to
both capitalism and patriarchy. in this sense, the state
is not free to act in the interests of all citizens equally,
but is limited by certain systemic pressures upon which
its legitimacy is based. Given my historical case studies,
what might one identify as the distinctly patriarchal pres-
sures or commitments of the state?
First, I would argue that the purpose of state
policy has been to reinforce a sexualized division between
a public male world and a female private world. As I have
discussed in chapter one, the foundations of the liberal
state were built upon a critique of the paternalistic
authority of an aristocratic social order. The voluntarist
View of state power required a fundamental critique of
a social order where political authority was based explicitly
upon traditional patriarchal familial relations. Liberal
thinkers proposed a different sort of social order where
hierarchical relations of duty, obedience to paternal
authority and obligation would be supplanted by an abstract
individualism where political authority would rest on the
free consent of the governed and state authority would
be strictly limited. in short, individualism would replace
Paternalism as the ruling paradigm for economic and political
life
.
Central to this critique was the assertion of a
new definition of the relationship between public and pri-
vate life. Freedom from the arbitrary use of state power
necessitated the establishment of an inviolable private
sphere of life which presumably would remain outside the
state's spectre of power. While the drawing of this boundary
has always remained problematic for liberal thinkers, the
division between family life and a public political order
has consistently informed this division. The threshold
of the home, therefore, provided one important limit to
the authority of state power. The family, once the para-
digmatic organizing principle of public life thus retreated
from public view into a newly created, specifically private
sphere. In sum, not only was the polity stripped of its
necessity, was also "de-
familial basis; the family, by
politicized.
"
It is important to understand that while the liberal
division between public and private life was intended as
a critique of patriarchalism, it also incorporated and
allowed for the continuation of traditional patriarchal
relations inside private family life. With few exceptions,
most liberal thinkers continued to view family life as
natural, necessary, and exempt from the voluntarist critique
Of public authority. m a sense, then the division between
the public state and private family life reconstituted
in liberal terms an already well-established hierarchical
division between the male and female worlds, and in doing
so rendered patriarchal family relations immune from the
critical political language of self-sovereignty and liberal
rights. As Mary McIntosh has most bluntly stated it, "the
state frequently defines a space, the family, in which
its agents will not interfere but in which control is left
to the man. ,.31
With these concerns in mind we can now turn back
to my historical studies. Specifically, how has the division
between the public male and private female spheres informed
the state s regulation of women's labor, and what are the
implications of women's primary identification with the
privatized family for her standing in the public world
?
While on the surface state labor policy was intended
to protect the health and safety of women workers within
the perceived limits of the police powers of the state,
at a deeper level of analysis it is clear that state policy
was guided first and foremost by the attempt to keep women
in a particular kind of relationship to the home and factory,
public and private life. With this underlying commitment
in mind, the logic of state policy can best be captured
through the dual concepts of "selective non-interference"
and "repressive benevolence." On the one hand, 1 will
argue, when women conform to dominant ideals about women's
primary position in family life they are exempt from state
regulation. On the other hand, the principle of repressive
benevolence is invoked when women begin to move into the
public world of work in a way which is perceived as a threat
to her central position in private family life.
While the state appears to have had less direct
control over the labor of homeworkers, it is clear that
the exemption of these women from state regulation had
as great an impact on the conditions of their work as direct
regulation might have. In the case of homeworkers, the
state's non-interference in private life reinforced women's
invisibility and underpayment in the labor force. Dominant
ideology defined women, and especially mothers, as primary
child-rearers and non-wage-earners, and assumed women's
economic dependence on a male breadwinner. Homeworkers
often had young children to care for and husbands
present at home were perceived by state policy-makers as
conforming to this dominant ideal. In addition, the paradigm
definition of work that grew out of the industrial capitalist
system established ideological barriers to any recognition
of homework as "real" wage labor. As the wage labor system
developed outside of the home, the paradigm idea of work
came to be defined strictly in terms of wage labor done
in the public sphere— ideological. iy and physically separated
from home.
As I've discussed in chapter two, while the ideolog-
ical distinction between home and work reflected material
transformations in the nature of industrial production,
it also mystified the economic importance of women's work
at home-paid or unpaid. Therefore, even though homeworkers
might actually be wage-earners their work was still perceived
as entirely consonant with their role as "mother." Even
though a dominant ideology of motherhood posed an anti-
thesis between mothering and wage-earning, homework was
never perceived as a threat to patriarchal family relations
because of women's continued presence in the home. In
addition, state exemption of homework from regulation would
insure the continuation of women's underpayment and there-
fore her economic dependence upon a male breadwinner. As
long as these working mothers remained at home, therefore,
the state would opt for a policy of selective non-interference
.
As long as patriarchal family relaHnnci atio s were perceived
as stable and self-sufficient =.0 i
'
nd as long as women remained
essentially confined to private life iho +. +.F i , t e state would find
no need to regulate women's labor.
The underlying logic of women's labor policy becomes
acutely clear when we examine the state's regulation of
women's paid labor outside the home. It is clear from
the nature of protective labor legislation that the farther
women move from her identification with the private sphere
of the home, the heavier the state's hand would be in regu-
lating her labor. Given the antithesis between dominant
views of motherhood and wage-earning, the increasingly
visible movement of women into the paid labor force was
viewed by the state as a threat to both good mothering
and, by extension, to the general welfare of society.
The regulation of women's labor, I have argued in chapter
three, was based not on the protection of women's health
(though no doubt this was a heartfelt concern of many who
advocated protection), but on an attempt to reinforce women's
identification with the home by restricting the kind of
work she could do outside of it.
At a more fundamental level of analysis, protective
labor legislation institutionalized a sexual segregation
of the labor market. Women who worked in predominantly
female occupations would be either exempt from all protection
(such as domestics) or have their conditions improved (such
as in textiles) by protective legislation. Women who
worked in predominantly male occupations would be either
prohibited entirely or have their positions seriously under-
cut by protection (such as in foundry work or the printing
industry.) And restrictions placed on a minority of women
who had forced their way into "male" occupations could
have a broad effect on future possibilities for working
women
.
Constrained to some degree by rhetoric of women's
freedom to work, fearful of taking responsibility for
throwing many women out of work and also aware of both
pressures from industrialists for the need for women's
cheap labor, as well as the need of working class families
for women's wages, the state could not simply enact laws
which excluded women entirely from industrial work. Instead,
laws were designed to reinforce work patterns that were
perceived as consonant with women's role as "mother" and
which reinforced women's economic dependence on a male
wage-earner by limiting her employment to the most poorly
paid sectors of the labor market.
The contrast between the state's selective non-
interference with homework and the state' s repressive
benevolent stance towards women working outside the home
can throw into sharp relief the inadequacy of an analysis
of state policy which relies solely on the liberal principle
of state non-interference into private life as an explanation
of the exemption of homeworkers from protection. As Michelle
Barrett has stated,
AlthcDugh the state is formally only interestedm such 'private' matters as sexuality only in50 far as they affect the 'public' good it isclear that the degree of state involvement insexuality and procreation renders the public/private split untenable. 32 P 1C
Arguments for protective legislation drew direct
connections between women's private standing in the home
and her proper public role in the work force
. Through
protective legislation all women were defined as mothers,
or potential mothers, and this "private" identification
constrained the ways in which she could enter the "public"
work world. As such, the state claimed a direct interest
in regulating the conditions of women
' s labor. Women's
ability to reproduce, therefore, was perceived as vital
to the state's interests, and was explicitly tied to the
general welfare of society.
In sum, state policy was guided by what I would
identify as a number of fundamental structural constraints
within which the limits of policy were set. First, labor
policy was designed to reinforce a particular variant of
the public/private split whereby women are defined as primary
childrearers
,
non-wage-earners, and are assumed to be
economically dependent on a male. And second, once women
do enter the labor force, they are restricted in both
explicit and implicit ways to sectors of the labor force
Which are systematically underpaid. Women's secondary
position in the marketplace then reinforces her primary
role at home, while women's central role in the home is
then used to justify her continued underpayment and ghetto-
ization in the work force.
Yet a crucial question remains: if state policy
is viewed as only an attempt on the part of the state to
reinforce women's oppression by reasserting women's primary
identification with motherhood and secondary position in
the labor market, then how could one explain the support
of women's organizations for protective labor legislation?
Were the Women's Trade Union League and its allies merely
misled into believing such legislation was in the interests
of working women? Clearly the support of women (of almost
all classes and sectors of the work force ) for state protec-
tion was not simply the result of false consciousness on
their part.
Just as welfare legislation is not only an instru-
ment of social control established in the interests of
a ruling class, so protective labor legislation for women
does not only serve in the interests of patriarchy. At
least in part, protective legislation must be seen as a
result of the positive demands made upon the state by worki
women, however limited these might have been. Legislation
was not simply repressive, but constituted a qualified
victory for those women whose working conditions were
improved by regulatory laws-those women in predominantly
female and organized occupations, such as textiles.
But the benefits of protective labor legislation
to women working in certain sectors of the labor force
is still insufficient to account for the strength and
breadth of support of women's organizations for such legis-
lations--^ support that was often couched explicitly in
terms of women's frailty and primary identification as
mothers. The tenacity of this support can be better under-
stood in the context of an understanding of the ways in
which alternative approaches to the improvement of women's
working conditions wre either thwarted, derailed or recon-
stituted to conform to the needs of a patriarchal social
system. In addition, I will argue shortly that women had
reasons of their own for advancing arguments which reinforced
women's primary identification with private life, even
3-£> they attempted to improve women's public standing.
As I have already discussed, not only were certain
organizations and perspectives excluded from the formal
political process, but also the demands of groups who sup-
ported legislation were shaped and limited by more subtle
political means. The recognition that only certain kinds
of arguments would be accepted and effective in influencing
those in power must certainly have played a part in limiting
the tactical arguments used by women to advance support
for legislation. while the intent of organizations such
as the WTUL was to improve working conditions for all women
they also perceived that arguments based on women's frailty
and proper place in the home as mothers would carry the
weight with legislators.
It is important to point out that the issue of
the improvement of women's working conditions was accepted
into the formal political arena only once it was couched
in the dominant terms of debate which viewed women as
mothers, not workers. And the fight for women's rights
as independent wage-earners was transformed through this
process into a plea for the special protection of women
as the mothers of the race. Only by reinforcing women's
association with the private sphere could reformers get
protective legislation passed. The gap, I would argue,
between the original intentions of these women (to improve
women's standing in the labor market) and the final result
of a form of protective legislation which was constructed
in a way that supported women's secondary economic position
represents a subtle exercise of power over and cooptation
of these women reformers.
But even reasons of political expediency are not
sufficient to explain why such a broad range of women's
organizations supported legislation which appears at least
in hindsight to have limited the options of women for equal
employment with men and to have reinforced dominant assump-
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tions about women. Returning now to a question raised
earlier by Lukes, is it possible to argue that the power
of dominant ideology was forceful enough to prevent these
women from conceptualizing of the issue in any terms which
challenged patriarchal assumptions? As Lukes has argued,
the "most insidious exercise of power [is] to prevent
people ... from having grievances by shaping their percep-
tions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they
accept their role in the existing order of things....
^
In order to address this question it is necessary
to take a closer look at the concept of "ideology." Deter-
ministic approaches to marxist analyses have all too often
viewed ideology as a set of beliefs about the world which
are produced by those in power in order to mystify social
relations of dominance and subordination, and legitimize
the privilege of those at the top of the social order.
As Raymond Williams has aptly characterized this approach:
A dominant class 'has' this ideology in relatively
pure and simple forms. A subordinate class has,
in one version nothing but this ideology as its
consciousness (since the production of all ideas
is, by axiomatic definition, in the hands of those
who control the primary means of production) or,
in another version, has this ideology imposed upon
its otherwise different consciousness, which it
must struggle to sustain or develop against
'ruling class ideology'. 34
Relations of domination and subordination are sus-
tained in part through the acceptance of a dominant ideology
which mystifies those relations by either denying their
very existence or painting them as natural and necessary
to any social order.
While social reformers clearly adopted some of
the basic assumptions embedded in the dominant patriarchal
ideology by arguing for women's continued primacy in private
family life, I would argue that they did so not because
they were determined in some abstract sense by a hegemonic
ideology but because they recognized, however implicitly,
the positive values of women's association with private
life. In other words, I would argue that while the sex-
ualized division between the public and private spheres
is one important foundation for women's oppression, at
the same time it has historically placed women in a position
to offer a fundamental critique of the kinds of relations
held up as the ideal in the public world. Women's exclusion
from public life (in itself never complete) forms not only
the basis of women's oppression, but has the potential,
however latent, to serve as a "platform" from which a
radically different vision of the world might be constructed.
From this point of view, the preference homeworkers expressed
for remaining at home (however qualified by the demands
of husbands and children or the limited options for other
work) and the reassertion of women's position in home life
by women's organizations take on new significance. Both
resisted attempts to sever women's connections to private
life and to integrate women entirely into the public world.
At least in part this resistance must be attributed
to the perception by both that the odds were better for
women inside the family than outside of it. For many women,
the limited promise of long-term security available to
them through their central position in family life was
simply not available to them in the public marketplace.
After all, patriarchy and the ideology of motherhood is
not simply an abstract idea about what women should do
or be that is imposed upon and internalized by both men
and women. It is written into the laws of the state and
the laws of the marketplace and places concrete obstacles
in the way of working women. The economy, itself based
on the assumption that women with children would remain
at home is not structured to absorb women with familial
responsibilities. The length of the working day, the lack
of child care facilities, and the market preference for
full-time year-round workers all serve in explicit ways
to limit the options of women, and especially mothers,
for work.
As in the case of homeworkers at the turn of the
century, women may well have viewed their central position
in the family over care of children and husband as an impor-
tant source of power. The hesitancy of homeworkers in
particular to relinquish this central position in the family
by going out to work may have reflected a realistic assess-
ment of their situation. After all, in the labor market
working class women could barely earn a living wage and
were under the constant scrutiny of bosses or foremen.
Moreover, the possibilities for earning an independent
wage were limited for most women even at the peak of their
wage-earning years, and steadily declined as they passed
marital age.
In contrast, retaining the stability of family
relations represented a kind of long-term security that
the market could never provide. Children of homeworkers
who were taught at an early age that they were responsible
for the economic survival of the family could be expected
to (and did) support parents in old age. And men who were
taught that they were responsible for the support of wife
and children could be expected to and often, though not
always, did--even as such support could be at the same
time wielded as power over wife and children. For reasons
not entirely of their own making, but not simply imposed
from "above" by a dominant ideology, women actively re-
asserted their central position in the private sphere,
even as they sought their fair and equal treatment in the
public world.
Though the historical economic limits to women's
full independence must have played an important role in
shaping the kinds of challenges brought to bear by women
on the state, I would speculatively argue that women had
other more positive reasons for reasserting women's primary
identification with the public sphere. Progressive reformers
viewed women's association with home life as a strength
and sought to bring the maternal sensibilities women develop-
ed there to bear on the public world. In seeking to expand
the state's responsibilities for the health and welfare
of its citizens, progressives advocated not only protective
labor legislation, but declared the "Decade of the Child,"
pushed for public education and promoted national health
care programs for mothers and children (through the Sheppard-
Towner Act of 1921.) 35 Attempts to bring to bear the
concerns of the private on public life represented not
simply an adoption of dominant ideology, but an alternative
challenge to it, even though such a challenge in the end
would be coopted.
In this context it is important to understand that
relations of domination are never fixed nor total. And
dominant ideology is never simply imposed. At any historical
moment, challenges and alternatives to dominant ideology
exist. Despite an ideology of motherhood which defined
women as non-wage-earners, some women have always worked.
And despite the dominant conception of women's inferiority
to men, few women have fully adopted the dominant view
of themselves as intellectually or physically inferior
(though some have tried.) In other words, just as women's
oppression is real and can be pointed to in the structure
of the economy, in our intimate relations with others and
in the laws of the state, so too resistance to domination
always exists whether it be in the hearts of women, in
the arduous struggles of isolated women to break into "male"
professions, or in the respectful and mutually affective
relations women struggle to establish in their intimate
relations with others. Dominant ideology never fully
captures the minds of those it is intended to denigrate
because lived experience always provides the fodder for
alternatives to it.
the power of dominant ideology should not
be underestimated: it infuses the very language we learn
when we first learn to speak, our intimate relations with
friends and family, and in its most powerful form it shapes
our perceptions of ourselves, our consciences. To challenge
this is not easy, but is always possible. For a dominant
ideology must always carve out parts of life, ways of living
as valid and legitiamte and exclude others. As such there
are always areas of human experience which can form the
basis for a challenge to it:
It is a fact about modes of domination that
they select from and consequently exclude the
full range of human practice. What they exclude
may often be seen as the personal or the private,
or as the nature or even the metaphysical . ^6
Though private family life is no haven in a heart-
less world, immune from the hierarchical power relations
of public life, it is often a place where human needs left
unmet by our stratified social order can push to the surface
and sometimes find satisfaction. As such, women's experience
m private life has the potential to provide the basis
from which to critique the competitive, individualistic
and exploitative relations of public life. The commitment
of progressive reformers to maintaining women's central
place m the home, the preference of homeworkers to remain
at home, and indeed, even the more contemporary defensive
stance of right-wing women against what is seen as the
feminist assault on women's role as mother can all be better
understood in this light. In this sense, women's reluctance
to abandon private life can be at least tentatively seen
as an expression of the value placed on the relations of
mutual dependence and nurturance, of a non-instrumental
sensitivity to the needs of others that "motherhood" has
come to embody.
The problem with using women's experience in private
life as a basis for a critical or alternative view of the
world is that it all too easily slips into a naturalist
argument about women's inherent moral qualities, and an
idealization of women's experience in family life. This
is a problem which continues to plaque the women's movement.
As Andrea Dworkin has written in a more contemporary vein,
"this is a frequent feature of ... environmentalist and anti-
militarist movements. Women are seen to have an inborn
commitment to both clean air and peace, a moral nature
that abhors pollution and murder." Women's natural
position as "mother" is invoked in feminist critiques of
nuclear weaponry with slogans such as "Take the toys away
from the boys" and "You can't hug your children with nuclear
arms." But naturalist arguments fail to see the social
character of women's oppression and in a "natural" sort
of a way lend support to regressive political claims which
equate women s difference with women's inequality. This
is precisely the problem that progressive reformers fell
victim to. Women's full and equal participation in the
public worlds of politics and work could never be won on
the grounds of women's natural attributes as "mothers."
Even so, to abandon the kinds of insights that can be cul-
tivated from women's experience in private life and used
to form a more social and critical analysis of society
would be to waste one of women's most important political
resources
.
If the key to any feminist analysis must be the
politicization of private life, by which I mean a full
understanding of the social foundations of women's role
as "mother," then there are special risks involved in a
feminist politics which do not confront other progressive
movements in quite the same way. All feminists must better
understand the repressive potential of the use of organized
state power to achieve their goals. As we have seen in
the case of progressive era politics, reforms that are
intended to improve women's status can further institution-
alize women's oppression and extend state power over the
lives of women. Yet at the same time such caution must
be qualified by the understanding that the state is always
vulnerable to pressures from alternative movements—movements
which can struggle, with both eyes now open, for a radically
different social order.
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